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B EFORE fighting began in the Persian Gulf, Congress engaged in a
heated constitutional debate on the power to declare war. While the
public watched on television, Senators and Representatives argued about
whether they or the President had the final decision-making authority.1
In the end, Congress agreed by a narrow margin to authorize the use
of force.' Because Congress concurred with the President's policy, the
constitutional theory that the executive branch alone could initiate hos-
tilities was neither squarely tested nor decisively invalidated. Nonethe-
less, the importance of the congressional role in war-making, in eclipse at
least since the days of Korea and Vietnam, was underscored.
But while attention was focused on the nation's capital, in cities and
towns around the country another much-less-noticed constitutional
drama was underway. This drama centered not on the proper balance
between the congressional and presidential roles in war-making, but on
that between the national government and the people. Unsatisfied with
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. This Article won
the Association of American Law Schools Scholarly Papers competition, and it was presented at the
AALS Annual Meeting in January, 1992. The Author wishes to express her appreciation to the
many colleagues and mentors whose work, encouragement, and criticisms contributed to the evolu-
tion of this piece, and to acknowledge the valuable research assistance provided by Melanie Lewis
O'Hearn, Mark Marroni, and Harris Freeman.
1. See Adam Clymer, 102d Congress Opens, Troubled on Gulf but Without a Consensus, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 4, 1991, at Al; N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1991, at A3; N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 12, 1991, at Al.
2. The final vote on the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution was 52
for and 47 against in the Senate, 250 for and 183 against in the House of Representatives. See Adam
Clymer, Bush Praises Move: Action Removes the Final Political Obstacle to Attack on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at Al.
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their role as just passive spectators of televised congressional debate,
groups of citizens in numerous communities mounted local efforts to
have a more direct voice in shaping military policy. The following sam-
pling of newspaper headlines reveals this less familiar story: "Calif. City
Backs War Resisters,"3 "Four Towns Seek Their Spot in International
Affairs,"4 "Promoting a Forum to Speak Out on War,"5 "Council's
Stand Against War." 6
Scholars have focused a great deal of attention on constitutional is-
sues in the formation of military policy at the national level, especially on
the question of what the proper balance should be among the three
branches of government.7 This Article addresses a less-explored but crit-
ical question - what is the constitutional role of local action?
We are so accustomed to thinking of military policy as exclusively a
matter of federal concern that it is easy to forget that, in fact, as in all
policy-making, there is a complex relationship between local interests
and national decisions.8 The question is not whether local interests are
3. Larry Tye, Thousands Protest Across US.: White House and UN are Among Sites ofAnti- War
Rallies, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 1991, at 3 (reporting that Oakland had joined San Francisco and
Berkeley in declaring itself a sanctuary for Persian Gulf war resisters).
4. Joan Livingston, Four Towns Seek Their Spot in International Affairs, DAILY HAMPSHIRE
GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 1991, at A9 (describing plans to debate Gulf war at annual town meetings in four
Massachusetts towns).
5. Elizabeth Neufler, Promoting a Forum to Speak Out on War: Crisis in the Middle East, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1990, at A20 (describing nationwide effort to organize local town meetings on
war).
6. Council's Stand Against War, DAILY HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 1991, at A2 (On Janu-
ary 3, 1991 the Northampton City Council unanimously passed a resolution condemning the then-
impending use of force to'remove the Iraqi forces from Kuwait on the January 15th deadline im-
posed by President Bush.). See also Michael de Courcy Hinds, Antiwar Effort Buds Quickly, Nur-
tured by Activism of 60"s, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1991, at Al (describing other local efforts around the
country).
7. Three recent works addressing these issues are: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (Louise Henkin et al. eds., 1990); Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOC-
RACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990) and HAROLD KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITU-
TION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990). See also THE PRESIDENT, THE
CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY (Edmund Muskie et al. eds., 1986) (joint policy project between
the Association of Former Members of Congress and the Atlantic Council of the United States);
THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF CONGRESSIONAL
SURRENDER (1974); LoUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT (3d ed. 1991); LOUIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972);
CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN
CHIEF (expanded ed. 1976); ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976).
8. As former Speaker of the House Thomas ("Tip") O'Neill put it, "[aill politics is local."
Larry Agran, Local Officials Should Speak Out on Foreign Policy, GOVERNING, Dec. 1987, at 74.
Larry Agran, the former mayor of Irvine, California and a leader in the "municipal foreign policy"
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represented, but how they are represented; whether they are filtered ex-
clusively through national government officials, elected or appointed, or
are expressed directly at the grassroots level.
One important form of grassroots action is popular protest. In the
area of military policy there is a rich history of such protest, stretching
from the individual conscientious objection of pre-Revolutionary
Quakers9 and celebrated civil disobedients like William Lloyd Garrison"0
and Henry David Thoreau" to the mass anti-war demonstrations of
World War I, the Vietnam War, and the nuclear freeze movement of the
early 1980's.12 Popular protest plays a critical, if often overlooked, role
in the shaping of official policy that eventually takes on the force of
law.1 3
My focus here is more specific. This article is directed not at grass-
roots action which takes place "out of doors," in the streets and unofficial
gathering places of our communities, but only at those grassroots actions
movement as well as a candidate seeking the 1992 Democratic nomination for President, argues that
"the distinctions between national and local politics have become obsolete in the nuclear age. By
spending $300 billion each year for military purposes - roughly one-third of the funds in our na-
tional treasury - we have neglected the serious technical and social problems of American life." Id.
9. For descriptions of eighteenth-century Quaker resistance to military service, see NONVI-
OLENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY xvii-xxiii,,9-13, 21-23 (Staughton Lynd ed.,
1966) and THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE: ACTIVE NONVIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (Rob-
ert Cooney & Helen Michalowski eds., 1987) [hereinafter POWER OF THE PEOPLE].
10. Garrison, a leader of the abolitionist movement, also espoused non-violent resistance to war.
See CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 57-59 (David R. Weber ed.,
1978); FANNY VILLARD, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON ON NoN-REsIsTANCE 22-28 (1924).
11. See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (1849).
12. For discussion of anti-war activism prior to and during World War I, see, e.g., POWER OF
THE PEOPLE, supra note 9, at 38-55; MICHAEL LNFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: UNITED STATES
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR 33-68 (1990); ANNE WILTSHER, MOST DANGEROUS WOMEN:
FEMINIST PEACE CAMPAIGNS OF THE GREAT WAR (1985); HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 350-67 (1980). For anti-war activity during World War II and the Vietnam
War, see, e.g., FRED HALSTEAD, OUT Now! (1978); LINFIELD, supra, at 69-111; LAWRENCE S.
WITINER, REBELS AGAINST WAR: THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENT 1941-1960 (1969); NANCY
ZAROULIS & GERALD SULLIVAN, WHO SPOKE UP? AMERICAN PROTEST AGAINST THE WAR IN
VIETNAM 1963-1975 (1984); ZINN, supra, at 462-92. On the nuclear freeze movement, see James
Finn, The Peace Movement in the United States, in THE PEACE MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES 162-66 (Werner Kaltefleiter & Robert L. Pfaltzgraffeds., 1985). For a discussion of
the role of state and local governments in the nuclear freeze movement, see infra notes 47-48 and
accompanying text.
13. The late Robert Cover stressed that law is shaped by communities of resistance as well as by
the official law-generating bodies of the state. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983). See also James G. Pope, Republican Moments The Role of Direct
Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287 (1990). On the role of
popular protest specifically in the field of military policy, see Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Domi-
nance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron? 12 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 25 (1989).
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which operate through the official channels of local government. The
theme is the use of local power to affect military policy decisions. The
issue is one not only of individual rights, but also of federalism. The key
question is what role, if any, the Constitution permits for decentralized
decision-making in the area of military policy.
Part I will demonstrate the surprising variety of local activity in this
field, ranging from local referenda on specific issues of military policy, to
community decisions to resist certain Defense Department projects on
health or environmental grounds, to a vigorous nuclear free zone move-
ment. Such activity has become more frequent and more self-aware in
recent years, part of a broader "municipal foreign policy" movement
which has grown in strength during the past decade. 4 Action at the
local level is often the most accessible means for citizens feeling other-
wise shut out from participation in military policy decision-making to
express themselves and be heard.
Recently, this grassroots movement has provoked a direct counter-
response from the federal government, which views such local action as
an unconstitutional invasion of federal prerogative.' One of the first
14. The "municipal foreign policy" movement took shape and gained increased visibility in the
early 1980's. Two important organizations which worked together to foster this movement were the
Local Elected Officials Project, begun by Larry Agran, the former mayor of Irvine, CA., and the
Center for Innovative Diplomacy, also in Irvine, CA., which was founded by attorney Michael Shu-
man in 1982. At the December 1985 Convention of the National League of Cities, Mayor Tom
Bradley of Los Angeles made municipal foreign policy a focus of his keynote address. See Michael
H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1986-87, at
154, 157.
The quarterly Bulletin of Municipal Foreign Policy was published until 1991 by the Center for
Innovative Diplomacy to report on efforts at the local government level along a wide spectrum of
international concerns. Reading any issue of this journal gives a good sense of the nature of activity
at the state and local level. See also Symposium, State and Local Governments in International
Affairs, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSP., Spring 1990 (Intergovernmental Perspectives is published
quarterly by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations).
15. The argument against local activity in the realm of foreign affairs has been forcefully articu-
lated by Peter J. Spiro, formerly a special assistant to the legal adviser at the State Department.
While still a student at the University of Virginia School of Law, Spiro authored a law review note
arguing that local anti-apartheid divestment ordinances were illegal. Peter . Spiro, Note, State and
Local Anti-South Africa Action As An Intrusion Upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L.
REv. 813 (1986). In a 1988 article critiquing municipal foreign policy more generally, Spiro recom-
mended that the Reagan administration "launch [a] legal campaign against local foreign policies,"
suggesting that it "need pursue only one or two such attacks [in the courts] in each of the major
areas of local interference, preferably until a victory in the Supreme Court. Once one law fell, the
rest would follow, and those cities and states that have acted will come to understand that they have
acted illegitimately .... Peter J. Spiro, Taking Foreign Policy Away From the Feds, WASH. Q.,
Winter 1988, at 191, 203. See also Will Swain, Feds on Offense?, BULL. MUN. FOREIGN POL'Y,
Autumn 1989, at 22 (detailing the Bush administration's "battle" with "renegade local govern-
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legal prongs of that response was the Justice Department's suit, in Sep-
tember of 1989, against the City of Oakland, California, to invalidate that
city's nuclear free zone ordinance. The district court decision favoring
the United States in that case is currently on appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit.16 In Part II, I will assess the competing claims that either military
policy is exclusively a matter of federal concern or that there is constitu-
tional space for input from the state or local level.
Part II concludes that while conventional wisdom and the trend of
recent precedent favor increasingly centralized control over military mat-
ters, in fact the constitutional text and its history leave open an ambigu-
ous and contested space for the interaction of local action and federal
control. Part III urges that this space receive legal protection. As I will
demonstrate, two important currents in contemporary legal thought -
neo-republicanism and feminist jurisprudence - both underscore the im-
portance of direct citizen voice and participation. Such participation
serves at least two critical goals.
First, grassroots activity permits each citizen to express and affirm
her own sense of self while making a larger commitment to the commu-
nity and the nation. Individual citizens need not be silent and frequently
cynical observers of national politics; they can be vocal participants.
Second, such decentralized action has creative and revitalizing ef-
fects upon national policy. War, and our now-permanent state of prepa-
ration for war, affect our daily lives and the lives of our communities at
the most intimate levels. This Article argues that our constitutional val-
ues would be enriched by stimulating, rather than choking off, grassroots
voices that speak to these concerns.
I. STORIES OF LOCAL OPPOSITION
It is impossible to assess the appropriate legal relationship between
local action and national military policy without having a picture of the
nature of that local action. The purpose of this section is to present such
a picture which is not exhaustive, but is detailed enough to communicate
a sense of its variety and scope.
ments" in its first nine months, over three policy areas: nuclear-free zones, nuclear-war civil defense,
and local anti-apartheid legislation).
16. United States v. City of Oakland, No. C-89-3305 JPV (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1990), appeal
pending, No. 90-16538 (9th Cir.).
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A. Local Opposition to Federal Civil Defense Planning
On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy told a joint session of Con-
gress that civil defense was a "major element of the national security
program" and announced the administration's desire to triple the civil
defense budget and transfer civil defense functions from the Office of
Civil Defense Mobilization to the Department of Defense. 17  This
marked a significant intensification of a federal program that had been
controversial since its opening days: the program to protect the civilian
population from nuclear war by a system of air raid drills, fallout shelters
and evacuation.18
While the civil defense program demanded active participation at
the grassroots level from both private citizens and state and local offi-
cials, it aroused considerable opposition from the very beginning. Critics
contended that the idea that the population could be "protected" from
nuclear war was a dangerous illusion. They argued that not only was it a
waste of money, but also that such planning, by creating a sense of false
security, actually increased the possibility of nuclear war and deflected
attention from the urgency of arms control.19
Individual activists who refused to participate in compulsory civil
defense exercises were arrested and prosecuted for their protests.20 A
number of local and state officials also decided, as a matter of local gov-
ernment policy, not to cooperate with the federal government's nuclear
war civil defense agenda.2
17. ARTHUR I. WASKOW & STANLEY L. NEWMAN, AMERICA IN HIDING 13-14 (1962).
18. For a vivid description of the civil defense programs implemented at the beginning of the
nuclear era, and their impact on popular culture, see ELAINE T. MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMER-
ICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA 3, 103-07 (1988).
19. See COUNTERFEIT ARK: CRISIS RELOCATION FOR NUCLEAR WAR (Jennifer Leaning &
Longley Keyes eds., 1984); Jonathan Mostow, An Issue for the People: Civil Defense in the Nuclear
Age, 8 FLETCHER F. 205 (1984) (arguing that the Reagan administration's "city evacuation" concept
of civil defense was "no more than an update of the bomb shelter mentality of the 1950's", and just
as ineffective).
20. See State v. Pinsince, 192 A.2d 605 (N.H. 1963); State v. Congdon, 185 A.2d 21 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1962); People v. Peck, 163 N.E.2d 866, (N.Y. 1959) (per curiam). See also Council v.
Donovan, 244 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Spec. Term. 1963) (public school teacher challenged license
cancellation based on refusal to participate in school shelter drills).
21. According to Carla Johnston, the co-founder of the Civil Defense Awareness network and a
consultant on the arms race to government officials and citizen groups, by 1983 "some 100 commu-
nities in 22 states had rejected nuclear war evacuation planning .. " SAM TOTrEN & MARTHA W.
TorEr, FACING THE DANGER: INTERVIEWS WITH 20 ANTI-NUCLEAR AcTIvisTs 134-40 (1984).
For a typical example, see PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY/NEW YORK CITY, ET AL., A
NEW YORKER'S GUIDE TO CIVIL DEFENSE (1983) (explaining the June 1982 decision of the New
York City Council to refuse all federal funds for civil defense preparations for nuclear war) (copy on
file with the author).
1992] LOCAL ACTION & NATIONAL MILITARY POLICY 327
Tension between the federal government's commitment to civil de-
fense planning and the resistance of some local governments has contin-
ued. During the Reagan administration, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), which coordinates civil defense planning,
intensified its activity and embarked on an elaborate scheme of "crisis
relocation planning" in which 400 urban target areas were to team up
with rural "host" regions to plan for population evacuation in the event
of nuclear war.22 Many communities refused to participate, leading fi-
nally to abandonment of the program.23
FEMA has continued to pressure states and local communities to
participate in nuclear war planning24 despite legislation passed by Con-
gress in 1987 intended to prevent FEMA from withholding funds from
any state that refused to participate in a "nuclear attack exercise."25
B. Local Opposition to Military Research
The Department of Defense (DoD) carries out extensive research
and development not only through its own employees and facilities, but
also by massive funding of private contractors.26 In some cases, such
research has produced adverse local reaction.
For example, city officials in Cambridge, Massachusetts, became in-
volved when it was discovered that Arthur D. Little, Inc., a private re-
search institute in that city, had constructed a special high-security
laboratory for testing extremely toxic chemical warfare agents under
contract with DoD. The Cambridge City Council created a scientific ad-
visory board and held hearings on the proposed research. Ultimately,
22. See Fred Hiatt, States Pushed to Improve Nuclear War Readiness, WASH. POST, July 10,
1986, at A4; STEPHEN DYcus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 448-49 (1990).
23. Civil Defense Relocation Plan Said to Be Dropped, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1985, at A7; The
McNeil-Lehrer Report: Civil Defense" Boulder Evacuation, EDUCATIONAL BROADCASTING CORPO-
RATION AND GWETA, Mar. 2, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Script File.
24. See, eg., David Tuller, FEMA Accused of Dwelling on Nuclear Wars, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26,
1989, at Al; Nuclear War Preparedness Dispute Resurfaces, UPI, Feb. 2, 1988, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPSTAT File (FEMA attempts to deny Oregon $1.1 million in disaster relief funding
for its refusal to participate in a mock nuclear war drill); Washington's Civil Defense Funding Appeal
is Denied, PACIFICA RADIO NEWSWIRE, June 30, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wire
File (FEMA rules Washington must forfeit $1.5 million in funding); State Charts Havens from Nu-
clear War, UPI, July 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPSTAT File (FEMA threatens
fund cut-offs to New York City and Albany, NY).
25. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180,
§ 3302, 101 Stat. 1248 (1987).
26. Appropriations for military research and development for fiscal year 1991, for example,
were almost thirty billion dollars. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990
and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189, § 201, 103 Stat. 1393 (1989).
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the city Commissioner of Health and Hospitals issued a regulation
prohibiting the "testing, storage, transportation and disposal" of the
nerve gas agents under study, effectively terminating the research. Ar-
thur D. Little sued the City, claiming, inter alia, that because the regula-
tion conflicted with a DoD-authorized activity, it violated the Supremacy
Clause, but the regulation was upheld by the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court.27
Similar efforts were undertaken more recently by students and citi-
zens in the town of Amherst, Massachusetts, where the University of
Massachusetts is located, in response to public disclosure that a research
project concerning anthrax, a biological warfare agent, was being carried
out at the University under a contract with the DoD's Biological Defense
Research Program. In response to citizen requests, the Amherst Board
of Health held hearings on the research, deciding that it posed no imme-
diate public health threat, while Amherst Town Meeting members voted
for a resolution urging the state's congressional delegates to sponsor leg-
islation calling for stricter enforcement of the 1972 Biological Weapons
Convention.28
C. Local Opposition to the Basing of Nuclear Weapons
Military plans to base nuclear weapons in certain communities have
catalyzed local opposition. One such case, which involved action by a
private anti-nuclear group rather than by local government, led to an
important Supreme Court decision defining the scope of the military's
responsibilities under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 9
In other cases, military plans for nuclear weapons placement have
provoked response from local government as well as from citizen oppo-
nents. In New York City, there has been a prolonged struggle among
federal and local officials over a proposed Staten Island "homeport"
where nuclear armed battleships were to be based. Opponents of the pro-
posal collected enough signatures for a city referendum on the plan.
Although then City-Clerk David Dinkins certified the signatures as
27. Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hosp. of Cambridge, 481 N.E.2d 441
(Mass. 1985).
28. See American Friends Service Comm. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
569 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
29. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139, 146 (1981)
(although there is no "national security exception" to NEPA, the Navy does not have to release an
environmental impact statement (EIS) concerning nuclear weapons placement, since decisions about
where to place such weapons are classified). See generally Cary Ichter, Note, "Beyond Judicial Scru-
tiny'" Military Compliance with NEPA, 18 GA. L. REv. 639 (1984).
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valid, a court challenge to the constitutionality of the referendum pre-
vented it from going forward.30
The state of Colorado has led prolonged litigation in opposition to
the basing plans for MX missiles. While the lawsuit was originally dis-
missed on political question grounds, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, sitting en banc, held that Colorado's claims were justiciable in
federal court.31
D. Local Opposition to Major Military Communications Projects
Military plans for elaborate electronic communications networks
have also aroused considerable opposition from the communities af-
fected. Two examples of such proposals which have elicited action from
local governments are the Navy's Project ELF (extremely low frequency)
and the Air Force's Project GWEN (ground wave emergency network).
The goal of ELF was to construct a communications system in
northern Wisconsin and Minnesota which would have the capacity to
reach deeply submerged nuclear submarines at sea. Details of the plan
varied considerably over time, but essentially it involved a small number
of surface transmitters with buried antenna cable dispersed over
thousands of square miles. 32 Because of public concern about the effect
of continuous exposure of plants, animals, and human beings to the ex-
tremely low frequency electromagnetic radiation generated by the pro-
ject, the governor of Wisconsin formed an ad hoc committee headed by
Robert Bock, then the dean of the graduate school at the University of
Wisconsin, to evaluate the Navy's environmental impact statements on
the plan. This led ultimately to a lawsuit brought by the state of Wiscon-
sin, joined as a plaintiff by the intervenor Marquette County, Michigan,
30. See Fossella v. Dinkins, 494 N.Y.S.2d 878, 880 (App. Div.), aff'd on state law grounds, 485
N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1985). A coalition of environmentalists also challenged the proposed homeport,
but that challenge was denied on the basis of Weinberger v. Catholic Action. See Hudson River Sloop
Clearwater v. Dep't of Navy, 659 F. Supp. 674, 678-82 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Despite ongoing opposi-
tion, the homeport project has continued to move slowly forward since the referendum was invali-
dated. Mayor Dinkins, who as city clerk had been the named defendant in the referendum lawsuit,
fulfilled a campaign pledge to oppose further development of the base by writing to Secretary of
Defense Cheney to request that no further work be done on it. Stephanie Storm, Dinkins Asks U.S.
to Halt Development ofS.L Naval Port, N.Y. TiMS, April 11, 1990, at B1.
31. Romer v. Carlucci, 847 F.2d 445, 450 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
32. For example, one ELF proposal called Project Sanguine contemplated two above-ground
transmitters and a 6300 square mile grid of buried antenna, while a later variant, Project Seafarer,
called for five transmitters and 2400 miles of buried cable covering a 4000 square mile area. See
Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578 F. Supp. 1327, 1335 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
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which challenged the adequacy of the Navy's environmental studies.33
The Air Force's GWEN proposal is to build a network of ninety-six
towers that will reach a height of twenty-five stories, each topped with a
blinking strobe light, which will constitute a communications system for
sending war messages to strategic forces during and after nuclear war.34
More than twenty communities which have been considered as sites for
GWEN towers have voted, through their legislative bodies, to oppose the
presence of the towers.35 Lane County, Oregon, one potential site, was a
plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the adequacy of the Air Force's environ-
mental assessment of the proposed construction.36 Partly in response to
this local opposition, in 1991 Congress enacted a moratorium on any
further construction of GWEN towers, pending further study of their
health effects. 37
E. Local Declarations of Nuclear Free Zones
The nuclear free zone (NFZ) movement is not just an American
movement, but an international one.38 Over the last few decades, citizens
in more than 160 American towns and cities and in more than 4000 mu-
nicipalities around the world have voted to make their communities nu-
clear free zones.39
33. Id
34. See No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc. v. Aldridge, 841 F.2d 946, 947-48 (9th Cir.
1988). See also Nancy Foster, Citizens Jam Nuclear Radio Network, BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIEN-
TISTS, Nov. 1988, at 21.
35. See Local Activists Chop Away at Gwen Towers, BULL. OF MUN. FOREIGN POL'Y, Autumn
1989, at 44-45; Not in My Backyard, BULL. OF MUN. FOREIGN POL'Y, Autumn 1989, at 38. See
also THE GWEN PROJECT, VOTES AGAINST GWEN TOWERS (informational pamphlet on file with
author listing the 27 communities that had voted against Gwen towers as of July 1989).
36. See No GWEN Alliance of Lane County, Inc., 841 F.2d 946.
37. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-27, 105 Stat. 140
(1991).
38. The best overview of the entire movement is GORDON C. BENNETF, THE NEW ABOLITION-
mSTS: THE STORY OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES (1987). For an international perspective, see also Tom
Christoffel, Nuclear Free Zones, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 869 (1987); Eric McFadden, Nuclear
Weapons Free Zones Toward an International Framework, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 217 (1986); Rich.
ard Vogler, The Law as a Nuclear-Free Zone" Legality and the Peace Movement, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L.
195 (1984).
39. The first NFZ was declared in 1958 in Handa, Japan, and there are now local NFZs in
Australia, Ireland, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and more than ten other countries, as well
as in the United States. BENNETT, supra note 38, at 125. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has
highlighted the question of whether the now independent republics, other than Russia, should be
nuclear free. See Francis X. Clines, Apparatchik to Nationalist: Ukranian's Fancy Footwork, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991, at Al, All. American communities which have passed NFZ legislation
include Chicago, Hawaii County, and Madison, Wisconsin, as well as many other cities and towns.
[Vol. 40
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Oakland, California's nuclear free zone ordinance, adopted by initia-
tive in 1988,4 prompted a lawsuit by the United States to have the ordi-
nance declared unconstitutional.41 A federal district court declared the
ordinance invalid not only on the narrow ground that certain aspects of
it are preempted by federal legislation, but on the broad basis that "[t]he
exercise of war powers is the exclusive province of the federal govern-
ment under the Constitution .. . [and] [s]tates and localities may not
enact legislation that impedes or hinders the national defense, regardless
of whether the defense activities are carried out directly by agencies of
the federal government, or by private contractors... "42 This decision is
currently on appeal; if affirmed on the same grounds, it would have broad
implications not only for the legality of nuclear free zones, but also for
other local efforts to regulate defense-related research, facilities, and
production.43
F. Local Referenda on Military Policy
Citizens have made use of the initiative and referendum process at
the state and local level to address a wide variety of military policy is-
sues.' During the Vietnam War, grassroots campaigns to put questions
BENNETT, supra note 38, at 254-56. In addition to the communities cited by Bennett, the city of
Oakland passed a NFZ ordinance in 1988.
40. OAKLAND, CA. ORDINANCE 11,062 (1988).
41. See supra note 16. For a discussion of the Oakland ordinance and of why the Justice De-
partment chose to bring a lawsuit against it, see Note, The Constitutionality of Oakland's Nuclear
Free Zone Ordinance, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189, 191-94 (1990).
42. United States v. Oakland, No. C-89-3305 JPV, slip. op. at 7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1990).
43. See eg., supra note 27 and accompanying text; supra note 31 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the legality of nuclear free zones prior to the Oakland case, see Patrick J. Borchers &
Paul F. Dauer, Taming the New Breed of Nuclear Free Zone Ordinances: Statutory and Constitu-
tional Infirmities in Local Procurement Ordinances Blacklisting the Producers of Nuclear Weapons
Components, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 87 (1988); William N. Weaver, Jr. et al., The Legality of the Chicago
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Ordinance, 17 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 553 (1986); Lori A. Martin, Comment,
The Legality of Nuclear Free Zones, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 965 (1988); Teresa A. Otruba, Comment,
Local Nuclear-Free Zone Legislation: Force of Law or Expressions of Political Sentiment? 22 U.S.F.
L. REv. 561 (1988). For a discussion of the court's rationale, see infra notes 202-08 and accompany-
ing text.
44. See, eg., No Cruising in Maine, BULL. OF MUN. FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter 1989-90, at 15
(describing Maine referendum urging the Governor and state congressional delegation to work to
end Navy cruise missile test flights over the state, based not upon the local health and safety con-
cerns involved, but rather upon a grassroots effort at affecting the then-ongoing START negotia-
tions); New Haven and Tacoma: "Yes" to Military Cuts, BULL. OF MUN. FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter
1989-90, at 17 (detailing New Haven and Tacoma, WA., referenda calling for reductions in Pentagon
spending and a shift of funds to domestic programs). See also supra note 30 and accompanying text
(describing proposed referendum on a Staten Island "homeport" in New York City).
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related to the war on the local ballot multiplied.45 Such efforts met with
mixed reception from the courts, some of which permitted such measures
to go forward, while others found them outside the scope of legitimate
local concern.46
A central component of the nuclear freeze campaign of the early
1980's was the effort to pass resolutions at the local level urging the gov-
emnent to halt nuclear weapons testing, production, and deployment.
In what one commentator has called "the biggest referendum on a single
issue in the history of the United States,"'47 more than 900 communities
ultimately voted on such measures.48
G. The Value of Local Action
Military policy decisions make themselves felt at the local level in a
variety of ways: by the impact of projects or facilities on local health,
safety, or the environment; by the deployment of financial and human
resources in certain directions while diverting them from other beneficial
purposes; and by the unquantifiable but nonetheless real extent to which
they contribute to or detract from a genuine state of peace and security in
the community. Ultimately, military policy decisions in the most literal
sense are matters of life and death, whether of "individual" deaths in
"conventional" wars, or of mass death in a nuclear holocaust.
Private citizens can and do express their views about such policies
through a number of channels: by voting for national candidates, lobby-
ing, joining citizen organizations, and protesting. In addition, they turn
to local government. This is natural because, as so many political com-
mentators have recognized since de Tocqueville's famous observations
more than a century ago,4 9 the strength of American democracy lies in
its local roots. Writer Elinor Langer acknowledged the grass roots tradi-
tion when she testified before the Portland, Oregon, City Council on a
proposed nuclear free zone ordinance: "We must act on the local level
45. See Edwin Conrad, Direct City Legislation on Foreign Policy Matters, 51 MARQ. L. RaV.
426, 429 (1968).
46. Compare Farley v. Healey, 431 P.2d 650 (Cal. 1967) (en bane) (holding that initiative mea-
sure urging immediate cease-fire in Vietnam be allowed on San Francisco ballot) with Silberman v.
Katz, 54 Misc. 2d 956, 283 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd without opinion 28 A.D,2d 992, 284
N.Y.S.2d 836 (1967) (holding that referendum to establish a new municipal office known as "Anti-
Vietnam War Coordinator" was beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal government),
47. Finn, supra note 12, at 163.
48. Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Local Foreign Policies, FOREIGN POL'Y, Winter
1986-87, at 154.
49. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 62-70, 231-45 (George Law-
rence trans., 1969).
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because that is where the hope of the American republic always has been
and always will be."" °
Acting through local government can strengthen citizen participa-
tion in at least five important ways. First, perhaps most pragmatically, it
provides financial resources. Instead of having to dig into their own
pockets to finance investigations of defense policy, information gathering,
lobbying, publicity, or litigation, concerned citizens can marshall the col-
lective resources of their community to further goals upon which a local
majority has agreed. This can help correct the imbalance between
wealthy private or corporate lobbying groups which may favor one pol-
icy option and less-affluent citizens who might otherwise lack the where-
withal to investigate or promote policy alternatives.
Second, local government involvement fosters knowledge. The ca-
pacity of local legislative or administrative bodies to develop a body of
information about relevant military policies by holding hearings, creating
advisory boards, and gaining access to official information from national
sources often will exceed that of private individuals or groups.
Third, working through local government is likely to increase pub-
licity and outreach. A broader range of citizens, especially among those
least likely to be aware of or included by private citizen efforts, may be
reached by public action at the local level. In most states, there are open
meeting laws and "sunshine" statutes which require public notice of, and
access to, all official activities."* Local governmental affairs are reported
in the local media. Citizens from diverse backgrounds and with diver-
gent viewpoints are more likely to learn about and attend local govern-
ment hearings on military policy issues rather than those held by private
organizations. Unlike many private events at which speakers preach to
the converted, public meetings under the auspices of local government
could be genuine opportunities for interaction, disagreement, and the ex-
change of views.
Fourth, when citizens act through local government, the stability of
citizen participation can be increased. Spontaneous protests, ad hoc op-
position groups, and poorly-funded organizations and coalitions - while
all important contributors to policy formation - are inherently evanes-
cent and transitory. Making use of the mechanisms of local government
creates the potential for steadier, more sustained action.
Finally, citizen participation gains greater legitimacy when it is
50. Elinor Langer, The "Moment Before", THE NATION, Aug. 1985, at 76.
51. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 189 (1982).
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channeled through the institutions of local government. Local officials
speak for their constituency; local referenda or ordinances represent the
authoritative voice of the whole community. When a mayor speaks or a
city council passes a resolution, it has a different impact from a mass
demonstration or even an opinion poll showing majority views. The me-
dia, people in other communities, and policy-makers in Washington
often take more careful notice. At least prima facie, such local govern-
ment action has the force of law.
Many would say that such action is not lawful precisely because lo-
cal government has no legitimate constitutional role to play in the foreign
affairs or national security field. This is the key question addressed in the
next section of this Article: what are the arguments for and against the
constitutionality of such a role?
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LOCAL ACTION
In his recent article The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Rela-
tions, Professor Richard Bilder, acknowledging his reliance on the semi-
nal work of Professor Louis Henkin of Columbia University,5 2 observes
that
the federal government is the sole representative of the United States in its
dealings with foreign nations, that it is entrusted with full and exclusive
responsibility and control over our nation's foreign relations and that the
authority of state and local governments to act in this area is very limited.53
The customary view is that what holds true for the field of foreign rela-
tions is equally if not more true for the sub-field of national defense: that
the federal government has a virtual monopoly of constitutional power.
Support for this view can be found in the text of the Constitution,
the history of its drafting, subsequent patterns of national practice, and
the relevant case law. But the record is not completely one-sided. While
the case for exclusive federal control is strong, there are aspects of the
constitutional text and history which point in the opposite direction.
Among these are some of the Constitution's most-neglected provisions.
While this Section will articulate the basis for the customary view that
the federal government has a monopoly of control over military policy, it
52. See, eg., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AH AIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, at 5 (1972): "Feder-
alism ... rarely raises its head in foreign relations since for these purposes the United States is
virtually a unitary state."
53. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTrrUTION 117-18 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990).
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will consider the evidence for this other, less-familiar picture of the con-
stitutional division of power.
A. The Constitutional Text
To understand the constitutional framework created to control the
country's military powers, the logical place to begin is with the text. The
language of the Constitution makes clear that one of the key functions
intended for the new national government was military: to "provide for
the common defense." 54
To fulfill this goal, the drafters empowered Congress "[t]o declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water; [t]o raise and support Armies ... ; [t]o
provide and maintain a Navy;... [t]o provide for calling forth the Mili-
tia... ; [t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Mili-
tia.... ."5 The President was designated the "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
States.... "56 Moreover, the Constitution not only confers military pow-
ers on the federal government, but also expressly forbids certain military
functions to the states: "[n]o State shall.., grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal," nor "without the Consent of Congress ... keep Troops, or
Ships of War in time of Peace... or engage in War, unless actually
invaded.... ,5
At the same time that the textual language creates these federal gov-
ernment powers, it also reveals a concern for setting limits on them. For
example, Congress is empowered to raise and support armies, but only
with the proviso, attached to no other congressional power, that "no Ap-
propriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two
Years."58 Congress is given authority to call forth the militia, but only
for certain specified purposes: "to execute the Laws of the Union, sup-
press Insurrections and repel Invasions." 9 The congressional power to
organize, arm, and discipline the militia is similarly circumscribed. The
text provides that Congress may govern only such part of the militia as is
"employed in the Service of the United States;" only that part, presuma-
bly, which meets the requirements set out in the preceding "call forth"
54. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
55. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 11-16.
56. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
57. Id. at art. I, § 10.
58. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
59. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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clause. Otherwise, the authority of the states over their own militias is
explicitly affirmed: the text "reserving to the States respectively, the Ap-
pointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia ac-
cording to the discipline prescribed by Congress. '
The president's power over the militias of the several states is also
confined only to those occasions when they are "called into the actual
Service of the United States."61 Furthermore, the Second62 and the
Third 3 Amendments expressly place limitations on the national govern-
ment's plenary powers in the military field.
These textual limitations suggest that the framers and the general
population may have had more reservations about the military role of the
federal government, and a greater determination to guarantee the
residual authority of the states and the people in this area, than is con-
ventionally supposed. The historical context within which the words of
the Constitution were generated provides support for this hypothesis. A
look at that history reveals not a single-minded determination to create
an exclusive national monopoly in the field of national defense, but a
more complicated and ambivalent desire to share power among the fed-
eral government, the states, and the people.
B. The Historical Context
The question of how to structure the military powers of the new
government engendered considerable controversy both at the constitu-
tional convention and during the ratification period. While all agreed
that the power to decide on war and peace was appropriately a national
power, there was considerably less consensus about permitting the na-
tional government an unfettered ability to raise armies.64 Many were op-
posed to the idea that the entire capacity for and control over national
defense should be transferred from the hands of the people and the states,
60. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
61. Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
62. "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." Id. at amend. II.
63. "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the
Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law." Id. at amend. IIl.
64. The evidence for the historical conclusions presented here is also discussed in my article,
Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference That Is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference
to the Military, 35 VILL. L. REv. 1009, 1023-55 (1990). On the desire to place limits on the federal
government's power to raise troops, see especially id. at 1033, 1035-38, 1041-43, 1045-55. The four
delegates to the constitutional convention who refused to sign the Constitution, Luther Martin, El-
bridge Gerry, George Mason, and Edmund Randolph, all cited the scope of the federal government's
power to raise armies as among their reasons for opposition. Id. at 1042-43.
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as embodied in the state militias, into the hands of the national
government.
These concerns were consistent with certain ideological currents of
the revolutionary period which were derived from English republican
thinking.65 Just as their English ancestors had engaged in prolonged
struggles to limit the military prerogatives of the crown, many Ameri-
cans of the founding generation thought it critical to limit the scope of
the central government's power over the military.
As a practical matter, these concerns manifested themselves at the
constitutional convention in two ways. First, proposals were made to
place direct limits on the national government's powers to raise troops.
This strategy had little success, as motions to incorporate explicit limita-
tions on this power into the Constitution were defeated.66 As a substi-
tute, the delegates adopted the temporal limitation on congressional
appropriations "to raise and support armies," borrowing this idea from
the British system, where Parliamentary appropriations for military ex-
penses were confined to one year. The goal of the British limit had been
to prevent the creation of a permanent army and to tether the Crown by
ensuring frequent Parliamentary review of military expenditures. 67 Simi-
larly, the American restriction was intended to prevent the growth of a
national standing army and to curb executive branch power in favor of
Congress.68
While one goal of this appropriations limit was to restrain the mili-
tary expansion of the federal government, it left ultimate control in the
hands of Congress; it did not directly confine the power of the federal
government vis-a-vis the states or the people. That balance was ad-
dressed more directly in the debate over the militia clauses. The issue
was how to structure the relationship between the already-existing decen-
tralized military institutions of the states, the state militias, and the new
military powers of the national government. This was a controversial
question.
' 65. For a fuller description of this ideology and its origins in English republican thought of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see id at 1023-55 and sources cited therein.
66. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 329-30, 341, 509 (Max Far-
rand rev. ed. 1966). See generally Levin, supra note 64, at 1035-43.
67. See Francis L. Coolidge, Jr. & Joel David Sharrow, Note, The War Making Powers: The
Intentions of the Framers in the Light of Parliamentary History, 50 B.U. L. REV. 5, 7 (Spec. Issue
1970).
68. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 66, at 330, 508-09
and THE FEDERALIST Nos. 26, 29 (Alexander Hamilton), Nos. 41, 46 (James Madison). See also
Levin, supra note 64, at 1036-37, 1041.
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Some of the Constitution's drafters, including Alexander Hamilton,
thought of the militias as unreliable and outmoded, and wanted to scrap
them and replace them with a more efficient, professional, central army
which would enable the United States to play a more forceful role in
European affairs. 9 Others, led by Elbridge Gerry and Luther Martin,
felt strongly that protection of the militia system was crucial both to
their less- imperial vision of America and to the preservation of liberty.7°
In the end, the final document embodied an ambiguous and perhaps
deliberately vague compromise between these positions.71 The inclusion
of the militia clauses testifies to the fact that the framers of the Constitu-
tion assumed that the state militias would continue to exist.7 2 Although
some at the convention had pressed to bring these completely under fed-
eral control, the final form of the militia clauses explicitly re-affirmed
state control over their staffing and training, and placed substantive lim-
its on the federal government's authority to call up or command them.
What was contemplated was not an absolute federal monopoly in the
area of national defense, but a coexistence between central power and
decentralized military institutions. As we shall see in Section E, this re-
lationship has evolved over time in unanticipated ways. But for now, it is
important to recognize that this duality was incorporated into the origi-
nal constitutional structure.
Despite the acknowledgement implicit in the militia clauses that
some degree of decentralized authority would exist, the anti-federalists
complained that the proposed constitution allowed too much unre-
strained military power to the central government. They felt that the
federalists' approach was both overly bellicose and dangerous to popular
69. Hamilton's views are expressed in his contributions to The Federalist Papers, especially
numbers 11, 23-29, and 34. See also RICHARD H. KOHN, EAGLE AND SWORD: THE FEDERALISTS
AND THE CREATION OF THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1783-1802 (1975); FORREST
MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON (1979).
70. On the conflict between an imperial and a republican vision for the new nation, see Cecil L.
Eubanks, New York Federalism and the Political Economy of Union, in RATIFYING THI CONSTITU-
TION 300 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Lienesch eds., 1989), and Carol H. Rose, The Ancient
Constitution vs the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern
Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 89-93 (1989). See also Levin, supra note 64, at 1042-49.
71. In Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110 S. Ct. 2418, 2422 (1990), the Supreme Court
described the relevant constitutional text as a "compromise" between these two conflicting themes
about military policy. For further discussion of the Perpich case, see infra Section E. See also STE-
PHEN Dycus ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 436 (1990) (describing the militia clause as a
"compromise between states' rights and nationalist delegates to the 1787 convention"); Alan Hirsch,
The Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the National Guard, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 919, 924-25
(1988) (same).
72. See, eg., THE FEDERALIST No. 29 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 41 (James Madison).
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freedom. 73 Desire to limit the national government's military powers
was a significant force behind proposals for key portions of the Bill of
Rights.
74
One of the amendments proposed most often by the state ratifying
conventions would have limited the federal government's troop-raising
powers.75 Although Madison omitted this proposal from the draft Bill of
Rights which he submitted to Congress in 1789,76 nonetheless one-fifth
of the first ten amendments address the military powers of the new gov-
ernment (if you exclude the general Amendments IX and X, the correct
fraction is even higher than one-fifth). While again, as with the militia
clauses, the subsequent history of these provisions must also be taken
into account, 7 7 our contemporary failure to recognize the importance ac-
corded to these concerns during the original ratification period distorts
our perception of the Constitution.
C. Historical Conclusions
What overall conclusions can be drawn from this textual and histor-
ical survey? Three key points emerge from the discussion so far. First,
as I've already suggested, a careful reading of the Constitution and the
original Bill of Rights reveals that the founding generation desired to
place limits on the central government's military powers as well as to
legitimate them. Second, one important avenue for accomplishing this
was through federalism, which assured a continuing existence for the
state militias and a decentralized control over them. Finally, it is impor-
73. The words of anti-federalist Mercy Otis Warren, writing under the pseudonym "A Colum-
bian Patriot," are typical:
Though it has been said ... that a Standing-Army is necessary for the dignity and safety
of America, yet freedom revolts at the idea... Standing armies have been the nursery of
vice and the bane of liberty from the Roman legions, to the establishment of the artful
Ximenes.... By the edicts of authority vested in the sovereign power by the proposed
constitution, the militia of the country, the bulwark of defence, and the security of na-
tional liberty is no longer under the controul [sic] of civil authority; but at the rescript of
the Monarch, or the aristocracy.
A Columbian Patriot, Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conven-
tions, in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 270, 277 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (footnote
omitted). See also sources cited infra note 149; Levin, supra note 64, at 1043.
74. See, Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 185 (1962).
See also, Levin, supra note 64, at 1051-55.
75. The amendments originally proposed by the states are described in 4 THE ROOTS OF THE
BILL OF RIo=s 734-35, 761, 842-43, 915-16, 918, 968-69 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1980). A chart
comparing the frequency of proposed troop-limitation amendments with other proposals such as for
free speech, due process, etc. is found at 5 id. at 1167.
76. 5 id. at 1026-28. See, Levin, supra note 64, at 1051-55.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 101-24 (Section F).
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tant to remember that to understand the specific mechanisms incorpo-
rated in the Constitution - whether the appropriations cut-off or the
militia clauses or the ban against the quartering of troops - one must
read them in the context of the overall political philosophy which
prompted them. It is not the precise details of these arrangements which
are most significant to us, it is their meaning. Part III returns more ex-
plicitly to this point.
First, it is essential to consider two arguments which may undercut
the contemporary importance of these textual and historical considera-
tions. One, closely associated with the opinion of Justice Sutherland in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,78 is the claim that the mil-
itary powers of the United States government do not in fact derive from
the Constitution, but rather from extra-constitutional sources. If this
were so, close study of the constitutional arrangements would be less
meaningful because they would not define the entire universe of the gov-
ernment's possible powers. This argument is addressed in Section D,
below.
A second argument is that the original constitutional arrangements
concerning the military are of minimal contemporary significance be-
cause they are premised on historical realities which are now obsolete.
Since the citizen militia and the quartering of troops disappeared long
ago with the musket and the bayonet, so the argument goes, eighteenth
century concerns about them are no longer relevant. This argument, cer-
tainly having some apparent force in a nuclear age, is addressed in Sec-
tions E and F. The continuing significance, if any, of the militia clauses
and the Second and Third Amendments is considered in these sections.
D. Are the Government's Military Powers Extra-Constitutional?-The
Argument of Curtiss- Wright
Scholars agree that Curtiss-Wright is a key case in the shaping of
contemporary ideas of government power in the field of foreign affairs
and national security. The case involved a challenge by a corporate arms
dealer to the validity of a criminal prosecution against it for selling
machine guns to Bolivia in violation of a presidential proclamation
prohibiting such sales. The corporation claimed that this proclamation
represented an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the
President, and was therefore invalid.79
78. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See infra text accompanying notes 79-87 (Section D).
79. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314 (1936).
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The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, but it is not the result in
the case which is critical here, rather it is Justice Sutherland's rationale.
Writing for the Court, he suggested that it was irrelevant whether, under
ordinary circumstances, this would have amounted to an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power. Instead, noting that this case con-
cerned government action in the field of "foreign or external affairs"
rather than "domestic or internal" ones, he expressed the view that ordi-
nary constitutional constraints did not apply. 0
Justice Sutherland's opinion articulated a constitutional theory
which sharply separated the "external" powers of government from the
"internal." The former, Justice Sutherland stated, "did not depend upon
the affirmative grants of the Constitution.""1 Justice Sutherland recog-
nized that the federal government's domestic powers had been trans-
ferred to it from the people and the states by the ratification of the
Constitution, but in his view the foreign affairs powers had a different
source. They had passed directly at independence from Great Britain to
the corporate government of the United States as an inherent attribute of
"sovereignty," independent of any action by the people.8 2 According to
this theory, the powers enumerated in the Constitution were at best sug-
gestive; they were neither source for, nor limit on, the central govern-
ment's authority over war, peace, and diplomacy.
Justice Sutherland's theory has been the object of much debate and
criticism; 3 however, Professor Henkin, while noting that it goes far be-
yond what was necessary to decide the case, concludes that it "remains
authoritative doctrine."8 " Since Justice Sutherland's opinion upheld the
validity of a discretionary presidential action, it is often seen as an impor-
tant moment in the enlargement of presidential power vis-a-vis the Con-
gress.8" No doubt this is true. More important are its implications for
the overall power of the federal government vis-a-vis the states and the
80. Id. at 315, 318-22.
81. Id. at 318.
82. Id. at 317.
83. See, ag., HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990); David
M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE
L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Histori-
cal Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973). See generally, Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 23-25 (1972).
84. HENKIN, supra note 83, at 25-26.
85. Professor Koh, for example, has pointed out that what he calls the "Curtiss-Wright vision
... tips the scales dramatically in favor of executive power." Harold H. Koh, Why the President
(Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1306
(1988).
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people. If the government's military powers, unlike its domestic ones,
were not transferred to it by the states and the people, then considera-
tions of federalism are indeed irrelevant. If the source of those powers
was not the Constitution, but an ill-defined national "sovereignty" which
passed directly to the United States government from Great Britain, then
in this regard the role of "we the people" was entirely bypassed.
Sutherland's theory in effect splits our national government into
two: a domestic government bound by familiar doctrines of constitu-
tional limitation, including federalism, and a foreign affairs or military
government bound by none. 6 Jarring though such a picture may be,
there is certainly both historical and case law support for it. 7 Yet even
those who would endorse such a theory, arguing that foreign affairs and
military powers by their nature are less easily confined within clear limits
than domestic ones, must be aware of the questions which it leaves unan-
swered. If the Constitution is not the limiting factor, what is? Did the
revolutionary generation really just re-create a new government which, at
least as regards its behavior in foreign affairs, was an exact duplicate of
the old?
The enormous body of discussion, debate, and writing about foreign
and military affairs which poured forth at the constitutional convention,
in the federalist papers, in the campaigns of the anti-federalists, and in
the proposals for the Bill of Rights, make it impossible to believe that this
was the case. The founding generation believed it was creating a govern-
ment innovative not only in its domestic aspects, but also in the way in
which it was to behave in the larger world. The constitutional terms
governing foreign and military affairs were meant to be determinative of
government powers in those areas just as other clauses were meant to
86. As Professor Henkin has pointed out, one logical deduction from the Sutherland theory is
that federal foreign affairs powers are subject to no constitutional limitations, including those in the
Bill of Rights. Yet he finds "no support whatever" for the view that Curtiss-Wright goes that far,
and concludes that the "safeguards for individual rights" found in the first ten amendments bind the
government even in this area. HENKIN, supra note 83, at 253. Despite Professor Henkin's conclu-
sion that the Bill of Rights does limit government action in the foreign affairs and military fields, it
often seems to be the case that it operates more weakly there than in other areas. Consider, for
example, the weight that national security interests receive when they are balanced against individ-
ual rights, or the unusual degree of judicial deference that is shown to the government when civil
rights claims are made against the military. See, e.g., Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518
(1988); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally, Levin, supra note 64, at 1013-22.
87. Professor Koh, for example, points out that while the Warren Court appeared to disavow
the Sutherland approach in favor of what he calls the Youngstown vision of a more constitutionally-
limited national security power, more recent Supreme Court case law has moved back in the direc-
tion of Curtiss-Wright. See KOH, supra note 83, at 134-40.
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define government powers in the realm of domestic affairs. Whether one
concludes that the former should be construed with the same degree of
strictness as the latter, or, following Curtiss- Wright, with a greater degree
of fluidity, the constitutional references cannot simply be ignored. The
constitutional arrangements indicate the nature of the new enterprise
which the founding generation believed it had launched. The next ques-
tion to be answered is how changing times have affected that vision.
E. The Contemporary Significance of the Militia Clauses
In the recent case of Perpich v. Department of Defense,88 the
Supreme Court acknowledged that the original constitutional scheme
represented a compromise between two conflicting positions about mili-
tary policy8 9, but then proceeded to undo that compromise in favor of
completely centralized control. The specific question at issue was
whether the federal government could order members of a state national
guard unit overseas for training without the consent of the state gover-
nor. The Court concluded that it could. The broader question was
whether the decentralized authority implicit in the militia clauses was to
have any continuing vitality. After Perpich, this is doubtful.
There is a long history of objections by state governors to specific
missions ordered by the federal government for their militia forces. Such
objections began during the War of 181290 and continued through the
Civil War,91 the war in Vietnam,92 and the controversy over proposed
training missions in central America in the 1980's which ultimately led
to the Perpich decision. 93 The governors' objections have been based on
88. 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990).
89. See supra note 71.
90. See ARTHUR A. EKIRCH, JR., THE CIVILIAN AND THE MILITARY 53-58 (1956) (governors
of several New England states objected to President Madison's call up of their militias on the
grounds that none of the three conditions required by the militia clauses existed); Hirsch, supra note
71, at 943-44; Note, The Constitution and the Training of National Guardsmen: Can State Governors
Prevent Uncle Sam from Sending the Guard to Central America? 4 J.L. & POL. 597 (1988).
91. Hirsch, supra note 71, at 944.
92. Cf. Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) (Massachusetts objects to deploy-
ment of state citizens in allegedly unconstitutional war).
93. Beginning in 1985, the governors of several states either withheld consent for their state
militia units to train in Central America (California, Maine, and Ohio), or announced they would
refuse if asked (Arizona, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Washington), or imposed conditions on such
service (Kansas, New Mexico, and New York). Twenty-six state legislatures debated the issue. See,
Note, supra note 90, at 613-14. In response to this controversy, Congress enacted the Montgomery
Amendment, National Defense Authorization Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 522, 100 Stat.
3871 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 672(0 (1988)), which prohibited governors from withholding consent
"because of any objection to the location, purpose, type, or schedule of such active duty." The
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the claim that the Constitution limits congressional authority to call up
the militia to three circumstances only ("to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions"), and that if none of these
circumstances is present, state control over the militia is constitutionally
guaranteed. Since none of these circumstances applied to Central
America in the 1980's, the governors argued, a non-consensual training
mission there was constitutionally impermissible.
The Supreme Court disagreed, explaining that what appeared to be
the militia referred to in the Constitution really was something different.
Beginning in 1903, the so-called state National Guards had been estab-
lished as the twentieth century equivalent of the militia. These militias
were gradually federalized, culminating with Congress's decision, on the
eve of the First World War, to make each of them into two simultaneous
entities: a "militia entity," fulfilling the functions of, and operating under
the constraints of, the militia clauses; and a "regular army entity," ex-
isting pursuant to Congress's power to raise and support armies. From
that time on, the Court explained, each member who joined the National
Guard engaged in a "dual enlistment" into both the state militia and the
United States military.
When the President ordered members of the National Guard to
duty in Central America, he was not, the Court suggested, ordering the
militia (which arguably would have been constitutionally forbidden).
Rather, he was acting under his power as commander-in-chief of the reg-
ular army. Since the brief for Governor Perpich did not contest the va-
lidity of the dual enlistment system,94 it provided no basis for attacking
this conclusion, and the validity of the Montgomery Amendment logi-
cally followed. However, it is less clear that the decision is consistent
with the original constitutional balance.
In response to the governor's claim that the effect of the decision
would be to undo that balance, the Court reasoned backward, starting
from the conclusory position that the Constitution "commit[s] matters of
foreign policy and military affairs to the exclusive control of the National
Government." 95 The problem with this conclusion, as the Court itself
governors of Massachusetts and Minnesota sued to challenge the constitutionality of the Montgom-
ery Amendment, with the Minnesota case reaching the Supreme Court. Perpich v. United States,
110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990); Dukakis v. Dep't of Defense, 686 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass.), aff'dper curiam,
859 F.2d 1066 (1st. Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1743 (1989). See also Anagnos v. Deukmejian,
No. C603218 (Cal. Super. CL 1986) (suit brought by an individual member of the Guard to enjoin
deployment dismissed after passage of the Montgomery Amendment).
94. Perpich, 110 S. Ct. at 2426.
95. Id. at 2429. To demonstrate this exclusivity of control, the Court relied on Tarbie's Case, 80
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noticed, was that it would appear to rule out the very existence of the
state militias.96 Yet there they are, enshrined in the Constitution and
reaffirmed in the Bill of Rights.97 To explain this, the Court appears to
have adopted a strictly permissive interpretation of the militia clauses,
viewing them as allowing the states to maintain and control their militias
only to the extent that the federal government had not, by exerting its
plenary power to raise armies, squeezed them out.9" By this logic, the
militia clauses would not in any way be a counterbalance to federal mili-
tary power, but were merely a transitory concession to the states.99
This makes Perpich broadly consistent with Curtiss-Wright in its
conclusion that the Constitution provides no real check on the expansive-
ness of the federal government's military powers."oo Curtiss-Wright in-
terpreted the terms of the Constitution as not limiting those powers
because they are not definitive. Perpich held that the constitutional terms
are not limiting because the Court interpreted them as describing only a
transitory state of affairs, a balance which will tip entirely in the direction
of federal power as the regular army supplants the militia. Perpich, con-
tinuing the trend of earlier cases, reached a high-water mark for central-
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871), which held that a state court lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas
corpus to challenge the validity of a soldier's enlistment in the United States Army. While Tarble's
Case is indeed one of a general line of decisions, including Curtiss-Wright and Perpich itself, which
have consolidated centralized control over military affairs, the Court was stretching the case to sug-
gest that it was determinative of the Perpich situation. Tarble's Case concerned state court jurisdic-
tion over the relationship between an enlisted soldier and the national army, while Perpich focused
on the militia and the question of its constitutional role.
96. "Were it not for the Militia Clauses, it might be possible to argue on like grounds that the
constitutional allocation of powers precluded the formation of organized state militia." Perpich, 110
S. Ct. at 2429.
97. "A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State .... U.S. CONST.
amend. II.
98. The Perpich opinion does not really make clear how the Court would reconcile the militia
clauses with the federal government's plenary power over military affairs. In a footnote, the Court
quotes from the opinion in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 383 (1918), to the effect that
the militia clauses guarantee power over the militia to the states only "to the extent that such control
was not taken away.., by Congress ... [only] unless and until by the exertion of the military power
of Congress that area had been circumscribed or totally disappeared." 110 S. Ct. 2418, 2430, note 29.
But then the Court carefully avoids indicating whether or not it continues to approve of the quoted
language, expressly noting that it need not reach that point to decide the Perpich case. Id.
99. This view is consistent with the World War I opinions in the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245
U.S. 366 (1918) and Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918), to the effect that the militia clauses create no
limit nor qualification on the national government's troop-raising power.
100. Indeed, the Court in Perpich quotes the relevant lines of Curtiss-Wright: "The powers to
declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties ... if they had never been mentioned in
the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nation-
ality." 110 S. Ct. at 2429 n. 28 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304,318
(1936)).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ized power. Before considering the implications of this development in
Section III, it remains only to be seen if the Bill of Rights has exerted any
meaningful pressure in the opposite direction.
F. The Contemporary Significance of the Second and Third
Amendments
Professor Sanford Levinson titled his recent article on the Second
Amendment The Embarrassing Second Amendment."' 1 One can hardly
imagine what adjective he would have used to describe the Third. 10 2
While there has been a small outpouring of recent scholarship on the
Second Amendment (to be discussed below), these two amendments
nonetheless remain the neglected stepchildren of the Bill of Rights.
Whatever significance they may have had in the late 1700's, they appear
to have become almost the dead letters of contemporary civil liberties.
The main preoccupation of current Second Amendment scholarship
has been the debate between the so-called "collective" and "individual"
right positions. The first view, favored until recently by mainstream
scholars, is that the Amendment is better interpreted as a protection only
against the federal government's interference with the states' rights to
maintain their militias, and not as a guarantee of the individual's right to
be armed.' The latter position, once the province of the NRA and
other anti-gun control advocates, now appears to be gaining scholarly
respectability; it holds that the Amendment does protect an individual
right to keep weapons."° While resolution of this argument is beyond
the purposes of this Article, I find the "either-or" dichotomy to be both
unnecessary and misleading. The meaning of the Amendment combines
individual and collective rights in a manner which fits comfortably with
its language: the (individual) right of persons not to be disarmed is pro-
tected so that the (collective) right of a free people to rely for security on
101. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989).
102. Professor Levinson does at least mention the Third Amendment, noting that "[o]ne will
find extraordinarily little discussion about another one of the initial Bill of Rights, the Third Amend.
ment." But he finds this lack of attention justified because the Third Amendment, unlike the Sec-
ond, is "of no current importance whatsoever." Id. at 640-41. As discussed below, this Article
questions that conclusion. See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
103. See, ag., LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 299, n.6 (2d ed.
1988); Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to Bear
Arms, 71 J. AM. HIsT. 22 (1984).
104. For advocates of this position, see, e.g., Robert . Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The
Second Amendment: Towards an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991), and
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82
MICH. L. Rav. 204 (1983).
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its own militia will be preserved. 10 5
One reason why so much energy has been expended on the debate
between the collective and the individual theories of the Second Amend-
ment is that the main practical question which has been asked about it is
whether it prohibits various federal or state gun control proposals."°6
But, as Professor Elaine Scarry has written, "the Second Amendment is a
very great amendment and coming to know it through criminals and the
endlessly disputed claims of gun clubs seems the equivalent of coming to
know the First Amendment only through pornography."' 07 She pro-
poses a deeper view of the Amendment which focuses on its origins as a
"way of dispersing military power across the entire population... a
distribution of authorization over our nation's arms." She sees the
Amendment as speaking to something more profound than just whether
citizens can buy machine guns: "Like voting, like reapportionment, like
taxation, what is at stake in the right to bear arms is a just distribution of
political power."' 08 This view, of course, is consistent with seeing the
Amendment as a limitation on the military powers of the federal
government.
At the moment, support for this view in the case law is at best
sketchy and undeveloped. It is not that the few Supreme Court cases
which have addressed the Second Amendment are inconsistent with this
position. Indeed, in the only case which actually discussed the Amend-
ment at any length, the Court emphasized that it originated in the eight-
eenth century's strong distrust of "standing armies" and sought to
"assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness" of a de-
105. For an analysis which also rejects an "either-or" approach on the grounds that "neither...
school of thought is correct insofar as it claims to entirely explain the second amendment, and both
are correct, insofar as they purport to offer partial explanations," see David T. Hardy, The Second
Amendment and the Historiography of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1 (1987).
106. See, eg., Burton v. Sills, 248 A.2d 521 (NJ. 1968), appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 812 (1969);
Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983);
United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir.
1974). See also infra note 109.
107. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to
Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1268 (1991).
108. Id. at 1268-69 (emphasis omitted). My use of the quotation is not meant to suggest that an
individual right to be armed has nothing to do with "a just distribution of political power"; some
would argue that protection of that individual right is essential to ensuring that the distribution of
power remains just. See, eg., Levinson, supra note 101, at 656-57. But whether or not this is true,
my point is to agree with Professor Scarry that the Second Amendment is not only about individual
gun control, but speaks to broader issues in the social control of violence, including control over the
military violence of the state.
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centralized non-professional militia."°9 But no case of which I am aware
has actually relied on the Second Amendment as a basis for protecting a
grassroots participatory role in decision-making about military policy.
This is not to say that Professor Scarry's vision of the Amendment's de-
centralizing potential is not compelling. Linked to other sources of au-
thority, the Second Amendment may well have promise as a possible
counterweight to the trend of cases like Curtiss- Wright or Perpich. But at
the moment that promise is inchoate and must await future development.
As for the Third Amendment, the paucity of both commentary and
case law about it make the field of Second Amendment scholarship seem
crowded by comparison. There is hardly any law review literature about
it,"10 the treatise writers say next to nothing,"' and only the oddest bits
of case law seem to address it." 2 One might at first easily agree with
Professor Levinson's assessment that it is "of no current importance
109. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). The question at issue in Miller was
whether the Second Amendment prevented the federal government from requiring the registration of
sawed-off shotguns; the Court held that it did not. The other Supreme Court cases which have
alluded to the Second Amendment, each very briefly, are: Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65
n.8 (1980) (citing Miller for proposition that federal prohibition of guns to felons does not violate
Second Amendment); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (Second Amendment applies only
against the federal government, not against the states); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886)
(same); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (Second Amendment does not apply to
invasion of rights by private individuals, only to invasions by federal government). For an interest-
ing discussion of Presser and Cruikshank, see Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 104, at 347-50. As
they point out, the Second Amendment has had, like so much else in American law, a tangled and at
times quite ugly relationship with racism. See also Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17
(1856) (African-Americans must not be citizens because, inter alia, if they were, the laws disarming
them would be unconstitutional).
110. William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Third Amendment and the Issue of the Mainte-
nance of Standing Armies: A Legal History, 35 Am. J. LEGAL HiST. 393 (1991) and William S.
Fields, The Third Amendment: Constitutional Protection from the Involuntary Quartering of Soldiers,
"124 MIL. L. REv. 195 (1989) are the only articles of which I am aware. See also Frank B. Lewis,
Whatever Happened to the 3rd Amendment?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1979, at 1.
111. In his treatise on constitutional law, Professor Tribe refers to the Third Amendment only
in passing. TRIaE, supra note 103, at 775, 1309 (noting that along with the First, Fourth, and Fifth,
the Third Amendment gives off "penumbras" or "shadows" from which the non-textual, constitu-
tional right to privacy emanates).
112. See, eg., Engblom v. Carey, 572 F. Supp. 44, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (prison guards' assertion
that the quartering of National Guard troops in their staff housing during their strike violated their
Third Amendment rights held to state a triable claim, but ultimately dismissed on remand based on
defendants' qualified immunity), on remand from 677 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1982), aff'd by 724 F.2d
28 (2d Cir. 1983); Jones v. United States Secretary of Defense, 346 F. Supp. 97, 100 (D. Minn. 1972)
(government's order requiring members of Army Reserve to march in a parade at national conven-
tion of veteran's organization which they did not support held not to violate Third Amendment);
United States v. Valenzuela, 95 F. Supp. 363, 366 (S.D. Cal. 1951) (government's post-war rent
control legislation held not to violate Third Amendment).
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whatsoever." 1
3
There are, however, two cases which suggest that there might be
some contemporary vitality for the Third Amendment as a limitation on
the military powers of the federal government. The first is the famous
Steel Seizure case,1 14 which invalidated President Truman's Korean War
seizure of the nation's steel mills. Justice Black's opinion for the Court
struck down the President's action on the grounds that it was unauthor-
ized by Congress, rejecting the claim that it could be justified by the Pres-
ident's powers as commander-in-chief of the military. Justice Jackson,
concurring in the judgment, noted that the Third Amendment set this
nation apart from many others by placing limits on the government's
power to commandeer private resources for the military. Even in war-
time, it required Congress to authorize such seizures; in peacetime, it
required the owner's consent. 15
Such consent was lacking in a recent case in which the United States
military occupied a large Honduran ranch owned by an American citizen
in order to set up a military training center in Central America. 16 The
Department of Defense took'over large portions of the ranch, without
any eminent domain proceedings, built a permanent tent camp, artillery
range, and other buildings, and moved over one thousand soldiers into
residence. The owner, Temistocles Ramirez de Arellano, sued for in-
junctive and declaratory relief. The district court dismissed the case on
political question grounds; 17 a panel of the Court of Appeals disagreed
with this holding but dismissed on the grounds that injunctive relief was
inappropriate as a matter of equitable discretion;1 ' and finally, on re-
hearing en banc, the full bench of the District of Columbia Circuit held
that "[c]harges that United States officials are unconstitutionally housing
over 1000 soldiers on a United States citizen's private ranch and running
military forays throughout the pastures cannot conscionably be dis-
missed by this court at the stage of a bare complaint."'1 9 The Court then
113. See supra note 102.
114. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
115. Id. at 644 (Jackson, J., concurring).
116. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [hereinafter de Arellano
Mi.
117. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 568 F. Supp. 1236 (D.D.C. 1983) [de Arellano 1],
aff'd, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983) [de Arellano II], reh'g, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) [de
Arellano III], cert. granted and judgment vacated by, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) [de Arellano IV], on
remand, 788 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1986) [de Arellano P1.
118. de Arellano II, 724 F.2d at 153.
119. de Arellano III, 745 F.2d at 1543.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
cited, in a footnote, to the Third Amendment. 120
These cases are at best suggestive of the notion that the Third
Amendment is not entirely archaic, since neither actually rested its hold-
ing on it. But they demonstrate that the underlying concern about the
federal government's appropriation of private resources for military pur-
poses is not completely obsolete. Perhaps not surprisingly, it turns out to
be a writer rather than a judge who has posed one of the most thought-
provoking images of a continuing meaning for the Third Amendment.
Testifying before the Portland, Oregon City Council in favor of a pro-
posed nuclear free zone ordinance, Elinor Langer said: "The early colo-
nists did not have to quarter soldiers in their houses 121 - remember the
Bill of Rights? - and we do not have to quarter nuclear weapons, or the
parts for nuclear weapons, in our cities."122 Like the Second Amend-
ment, the Third, despite its apparent obsolescence, may yet have a new
life.
But for now, the only fair reading of existing precedent must ac-
knowledge that the Second and Third Amendments, whatever their orig-
inal intentions, have failed to play any meaningful role in constraining
the military power of the central government. Although for the ratifiers
of the Constitution - who were after all its ultimate authors123 - these
amendments, singly and in combination, were a crucial part of the over-
all package of civil liberties which they wanted to protect from govern-
ment invasion, their descendants have not so far made much use of them.
Perhaps this is because they were tied to a specific military technology
which has now been superseded, the technology of the musket and the
citizen-soldier being replaced by that of the missile and the defense indus-
try engineer. 2
120. "The spirit of the Nation's historic commitment to protecting private citizens' rights
against military excesses is embodied in the Third Amendment's express prohibition against the
quartering of soldiers in private homes." Id. at 1543 n.186.
121. Ms. Langer should be forgiven a writer's poetic inaccuracy; in truth, the early colonists did
have to quarter British soldiers in their homes and it was precisely in reaction to this experience that
the post-Revolutionary proponents of the Bill of Rights were determined to include an amendment
prohibiting that practice. Obviously, at the time of the passage of the Bill of Rights the early Ameri-
cans were no longer in fact "colonists" subject to the rule of the British crown.
122. Langer, supra note 50, at 78.
123. "Once we remember that it was popular ratification that transformed a mere proposal into
binding law, we cannot but choose as our supreme legal text the edition that was in fact offered to
and endorsed by the People .. " Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial
Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286 (1987) (citations omitted).
124. But see Levinson, supra note 101, at 656 ("[I]t is hard for me to see how one can argue that
circumstances have so changed as to make mass disarmament constitutionally unproblematic.")
(footnote omitted).
[Vol. 40
1992] LOCAL ACTION & NATIONAL MILITARY POLICY 351
Still, we did not eliminate the First Amendment because of the in-
vention of radio and television, or the Fourth because of the discovery of
how to wiretap a phone. Surely changing times require changing under-
standings, which is why an interpretive approach limited to the letter of
the original Constitution is so unsatisfying. Our goal should be to pene-
trate the spirit of that document and give it contemporary life. If the
desire to ensure decentralized control over the nation's military powers
was so powerful in the militia age, is this any less true in the age of the
atom bomb? In the final section of this Article, I will make the case for
why the value of decentralization remains compelling.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCAL ACTION
As a school child in the late 1950's, I often participated in air raid drills
meant to prepare us for nuclear attack A siren sounded and we were
marched from our classrooms into the halls, where we crouched face down on
the floor by the cement block walls, carefully instructed to stay away from
windows in case of flying glass. Until they rang the all-clear, we were to
remain there silent, hands clasped over the backs of our necks to shield us
from the atomic blast.
This image of mute passivity conveys what Robert Jay Lifton, the
renowned psychiatrist and anti-nuclear activist,12 has called "nuclear
numbing, ' 126 the process by which people shield themselves from true
awareness of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.127 In Lifton's
words, nuclear numbing causes people to push away their doubts and
fears, "leaving everything to leaders and experts."1 28 When "[flear and a
sense of threat break through prior numbing; these uncomfortable (po-
tentially shattering) feelings in turn raise the personal question of
whether one should take some form of action to counter the danger; that
question becomes an additional source of conflict, associated as it is with
125. Dr. Lifton's books on nuclearism and other issues of war and violence include: ROBERT J.
LIFTON, DEATH IN LIFE: SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA (1968), ROBERT J. LIPTON, HOME FROM THE
WAR: VIETNAM VETERANS-NEITHER VICTIMS NOR EXECUTIONERS (1973), ROBERT J. LIPTON,
THE NAZi DOCTORS (1986), ROBERT J. LiPTON & RICHARD FALK, CRIMES OF WAR (1971), and
ROBERT J. LIFTON & RICHARD FALK, INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS: THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL CASE AGAINST NUCLEARiSM (1982) [hereinafter INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS].
126. INDEFENSIBLE WEAPONS, supra note 125, passim.
127. Lifton himself suggests that the air-raid drill is illustrative of the "absurdity of the mind"
engendered by nuclear numbing, describing a picture of "the seven-year-old school girl, following
her teacher's advice in the midst of a nuclear aid-raid drill.., and holding a sheet of paper over her
head to protect herself from fallout." Id. at 5.
128. Id. at 10.
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1"129feelings of helplessness and doubts about efficacy....
In the summer of 1985 in Portland, Oregon, a grassroots campaign
was underway to have the city declare itself a nuclear free zone. The
Mayor and City Council were unsure of how to proceed, troubled by
whether they had jurisdiction, worried if such an ordinance would be
constitutional, wondering whether it would make sense. Before any
councillor had yet officially introduced a proposed ordinance, the writer
Elinor Langer testified in favor of one before the City Council. Her de-
scription of her struggles with just the kinds of conflicts Dr. Lifton wrote
about merits quoting at some length:
As someone whose work involves the habit of introspection, I can re-
port that between my longstanding "right opinions" on the subject of nu-
clear war and my appearance here today - my first such public appearance
- my mind presented me with many arguments against testifying, includ-
ing (a) my preoccupation with other matters; (b) my lack of expertise; (c)
the largely symbolic nature of the issue, at least in relation td national de-
fense if not in relation to the city; and (d) the futility of action. I hope I
may be forgiven a writer's presumption if I say I wonder whether the rea-
soning of members of the City Council, which has led to the absence of an
actual ordinance today, is not much the same: namely, there are other is-
sues before us; it is not really our jurisdiction; it is too limited in its national
impact to take any risks for locally; and ultimately, we are lost anyway.
The problem with this reasoning is, of course, its circularity. If we act,
we may die; but if we don't act, we will surely die....
... It is our place to act, it is all of our places to act, because there is no
force other than public opinion that is capable of bringing about change.
The Federal government not only cannot lead, it can barely follow....
Every instance of progress in arms control that has been made since 1945
has been made in response to just such public pressure as declaring Port-
land a nuclear-free zone would represent.130
By now it is almost platitudinous to complain about the political
apathy of American citizens, their dismal percentage of voting, their dis-
interest, their cynicism. Yet when concern moves them to become active
on the local level in connection with issues of war and peace, one of
the first obstacles they are likely to confront is the claim that this is not
within the legitimate sphere of local concern. If we read our Constitu-
tion as shutting out such local action, as relegating these issues exclu-
sively to the jurisdiction of the federal government, are we not
129. Id.
130. Langer, supra note 50, at 77-78.
131. See supra Section I (for examples of such local activism).
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contributing to the very apathy which we decry? Our search should be
for ways to revitalize, not to squelch, such grassroots action.
Part II concluded that the original constitutional design contem-
plated such grassroots participation. But while the structure of the Con-
stitution and the intentions behind key portions of the Bill of Rights
represented a desire to strike a balance between centralized and decen-
tralized control over military power, the subsequent interpretive history
has moved strongly in the direction of exclusively centralized control. 132
This Section makes the argument for redressing that imbalance.
As I will demonstrate below, at least two important themes in recent
jurisprudence - neo-republicanism and feminism - underscore the im-
portance of fostering a more vocal and participatory citizenry. Such par-
ticipation is as necessary and appropriate in regard to issues of national
security and national defense policy as in other policy areas. These
themes will be discussed in Sections A and B. Finally, Section C con-
cludes that the goals of voice and participation can be furthered by nur-
turing local activity. Such activity rests on a revised conception of
federalism, a conception which focuses not on "states' rights," but on
maximizing opportunities for people to participate in government, to
speak and be heard.
A. Neo-republicanism and the Importance of Participation
As perhaps is too often the case with intellectual vogues, a good idea
is first promulgated, then attacked, and then begins to sink beneath the
weight of citations and counter-citations. So it appears to be with repub-
licanism. By now, the law review literature on it is so extensive that it
would be foolish to attempt to cite it all,133 and the criticisms and qualifi-
cations which have been made of it are so complex that it sometimes
seems difficult to know exactly what remains.13 4
132. See supra Section II, parts D-E.
133. Some key citations include: Symposium on Republicanism and Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L.
REV. 409 (1989); Symposium, Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modern
Constitutional Theory, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1989); Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitu-
tional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57 (1987). For important works outside the law reviews,
see, e.g., Peter S. Onuf, Forum, Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicen-
tennial Perspective, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 341 (1989); Joyce Appleby, Republicanism and Ideology, 37
AM. Q. 461 (1985); and, of course, BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION (1967).
134. Joyce Appleby commented some years ago that "[r]epublicanism slipped into the scholarly
lexicon in the late 1960's and has since become the most protean concept for those working on the
culture of antebellum America." Appleby, supra note 133, at 461.
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One source of confusion has been the tendency of the "republican
revival" to conflate two meanings of the term which Joyce Appleby has
described as its two scholarly "careers." 13 The first is the use of the
term republicanism to refer to an actual set of ideas held at a certain time
in history by certain politically conscious thinkers, namely those ideas
held by the American revolutionary generation, derived from English re-
publican political thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The second is the use of the word to refer more generally to a certain
political orientation, or ideology, that its proponents believe continues to
have contemporary value. This orientation, which I will call "neo-repub-
licanism," is often put forward as a counterweight to the tenets of classi-
cal "liberalism."' 13
6
One key feature distinguishing "liberalism" from "neo-republican-
ism" is the value each places on political participation. For "liberalism,"
participation is at best a secondary value and at worst a nuisance. Since
the goal of government is to secure private happiness, one participates
only as much as is minimally necessary to ensure that this is the case.
Given that participation is viewed primarily as instrumental, it makes
sense to leave politics for the most part to professionals and experts.
Every few years, one can rely on the vote as a tool for throwing out one's
representatives if they are not serving one's needs.13 7
For "neo-republicanism," on the other hand, political participation
is primary - an activity which is essential both to individual satisfaction
and to the health of the state. a13  Hannah Arendt is a leading example of
a political philosopher who has championed this tradition of par-
ticipatory politics, which she calls "public happiness."'31 She describes
135. Appleby, supra note 133, at 462. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism,
and is it worth reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989) (describing the "two wellsprings" of the
republican revival as historical and ideological).
136. I use the quotation marks to signal that these terms refer to archetypes of"neo-republican-
ism" and "liberalism," rather than to any realistic or nuanced description of a particular variation of
those types which actually existed at anytime either in theory or in history. My goal is to contrast
two sets of assumptions about the practice of politics, not to capture the often mixed reality of how
they play out in the actual world.
137. See Paul Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 185-88 (1985)
(describing a "consumer conception" of democracy which is equivalent to this paradigm of
"liberalism").
138. See, eg., HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 119-20, 221 (1965) (the most important
aspect of republican political freedom is the right "to be a participator in government"); C. Edwin
Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican Politics, 41 FLA. L. REV. 491, 513-14
(1989); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1503, 1531 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1555 (1988).
139. See ARENDT, supra note 138, at 123.
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the ambiguity inherent in the American founding period, when it was
uncertain whether "the new government was to constitute a realm of its
own for the 'public happiness' of its citizens, or whether it had been de-
vised solely to serve and ensure their pursuit of private happiness more
effectively than had the old regime." 1" She contends that despite consid-
erable ambivalence about this throughout American history, "the revolu-
tionary notions of public happiness and political freedom have never
altogether vanished ... they have become part and parcel of the very
structure of the political body of the republic.""14 It is from the persis-
tence of such notions that neo-republicanism draws its force.
It is unnecessary to repeat here the case ably made by other neo-
republicans in support of the value of citizen participation. In this time
of widespread political apathy and cynicism, the case for increased citi-
zen involvement seems particularly strong. For present purposes, what is
important is to connect the general argument in favor of political partici-
pation to a more specific argument about the importance of participation
in decision-making about the exercise of state violence - that is, to the
argument favoring decentralized control over military power. Just such
an argument was a central component of classical republican ideology.
It is probably a misunderstanding of this aspect of the participatory
theory of republicanism that has resulted in the frequent criticism that
republicanism is "militaristic." Several critics of neo-republicanism have
made this charge to cast doubt on its value, 42 while even neo-republican
proponents have sought to distance themselves from it. 43 But a more
careful consideration of the meaning of the "armed citizen" for republi-
cans reveals that the charge of militarism is an oversimplification.
Pocock explains the relationship between the Machiavellian "exalta-
tion of the civic militia" and his "Aristotelian theory of citizenship."
The point is not to foster militarism but to restrain it - to prevent the
dangers that stem from a professional caste of soldiers whose entire dedi-
cation is to the arts of war and not to the civic community. As Pocock
explains:
A man who should devote the whole of his energies to the arte della lana
[commerce] and none to participation in public affairs would appear in
140. Id. at 130.
141. Id. at 135.
142. See, eg., Wendy Brown, Guns. Cowboys Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism:
On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661, 665-67 (1989);
Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism - Or the Flight From Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633,
1635-36 (1988).
143. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, supra note 138, at 1495; Sunstein, supra note 138, at 1539-40.
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classical theory as less than a citizen and a source of weakness to his fel-
lows; but a man who should devote the whole of his energies to the arte
della guerra - Machiavelli sometimes uses phrases like "make war his
arte" - is an infinitely greater danger. The banausic tradesman is pursuing
a limited good to the neglect of the common good, and that is bad; ... but
the banausic soldier is far more likely to do this, and to do it in a far more
antisocial way, because his arte is to exercise the means of coercion and
destruction. 144
In republican thought, the arming of the citizen-soldier is not in-
tended to militarize society, but toprevent the growth of military institu-
tions detached from daily civilian life. The linkage of the citizen and the
soldier is intended not to glorify the career of the soldier, but to prevent
it from being a career - as Pocock explains, the "central point is that it
must on no account become a separately organized profession to which
men look for the whole of their living. A soldier who is nothing but a
soldier is a menace to all other social activities.... "14 5 As Pocock later
reminds us, this distrust of the professional warrior and attachment to
the citizen militia were vital features of the thinking of many members of
the founding generation in America - as the famous episode of the Soci-
ety of the Cincinnati illustrates. 1" The deep public fear that this society
of former military officers would become an oligarchy that would seize
the reins of government power resonated with republican concern about
the dangers of professional armies. Pocock points out that the guarantee
demanded by the ratifiers of the Constitution of their right to constitute
themselves a "well regulated militia" is founded in the classical republi-
can tradition, noting that "the Second Amendment to the Constitution,
apparently drafted to reassure men's minds against the fact that the fed-
eral government would maintain something in the nature of a profes-
sional army, affirms the relation between a popular militia and popular
freedom in language directly descended from that of Machiavelli." 14 7
The armed citizenry so important to republican ideology simultane-
ously served several goals. While the notion of its value as an ultimate
bulwark against government tyranny is familiar to us, and has received
increased scholarly attention of late, 4 ' the equally important goal of
avoiding the growth of professional military institutions is less familiar
144. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOuHT
AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 200 (1975).
145. Id. at 199.
146. The Society of the Cincinnati was a semi-secret organization of former Continental Army
officers which many feared was plotting an aristocratic coup. See KOHN, supra note 69, at 52-53.
147. POCOCK, supra note 144, at 528.
148. See Kates, supra note 104, at 232-33; Levinson, supra note 101, at 648.
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and has been less well understood. Similarly, there is another important
purpose which has received insufficient attention - that of assuring
widespread citizen consent to the nation's use of armed force.
The anti-federalists' commitment to this was one reason for their
objections to the military arrangements of the proposed constitution.
Many believed that the unrestrained power of the federal government to
raise a professional army would permit the country's "rulers" to engage
in an end run around the militia and become involved in aggressive Euro-
pean wars which would serve only their interests, not that of the major-
ity.149 Anti-federalists also complained that federal control over the
militia would lead to militia members being dragged out of state against
their will to put down slave revolts or "subdue their fellow citizens" even
when they believed the causes for upheaval were just.150 Reliance instead
on a decentralized militia for military force would in effect demand a
plebiscite of citizens each time armed force was invoked; in the most
literal sense, people would "vote with their feet" - or in this case, their
bodies.
Professor Scarry has pointed out this aspect of the meaning of an
armed citizenry.151 She discusses a view of the social contract in which,
contrary to our usual understanding, war demands that "the processes of
consent have to be more explicit than under ordinary peacetime condi-
tions."152 Kant, for example, said that:
[e]very nation must be so organized internally that not the head of the na-
tion - for whom, properly speaking, war has no cost, (since he puts the
expense off on others, namely the people) - but rather the people who pay
for it have the decisive voice as to whether or not there should be war.15 3
149. See, eg., Essays of Brutus, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 401 (Herbert J. Storing
ed., 1981); Letter from Cincinnatus to James Wilson, New York Journal (Nov. 22, 1787), in 6 id. at
16-17; Objections by a Son of Liberty, in 6 id. at 35; Essays by a Farmer, in 4 id. at 207. Mercy Otis
Warren, writing as the "Columbian Patriot," expressed the general sentiment when she foresaw the
new national military power being used not for genuine national defense, but to "maintain ... the
splendour of the most useless part of the community." Observations on the New Constitution, and on
the Federal and State Conventions by a Columbian Patriot, in 4 id. at 277. See generally Levin, supra
note 64, at 1045-51. See also PococK, supra note 144, at 528-31.
150. See Objections by a Son of Liberty, in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note
149, at 35; The Letters of Centinel, in 2 id. at 159-60; The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the
Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, in 3 id. at 164-65. See generally,
Levin, supra note 64, at 1046-49.
151. Scarry, supra note 107, at 1266-69.
152. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: The Right to Bear Arms, 2 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 119 (1990).
153. Scarry, supra note 107, at 1257 (quoting Immanuel Kant, On the Proverb That May be
True in Theory but is of no Practical Use, reprinted in PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
PoLrncs: HISTORY AND MORALS (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983)).
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This view is congruent with a republican understanding of social control
over military force, a view which Scarry, like Professor Pocock, finds
inherent in the Second Amendment.
The eighteenth century mechanisms for assuring this diffusion of
consent over military power were the reliance for national security on the
militia, the continuing decentralization of control over that militia, the
guarantee of an armed citizenry, and the power of the individual prop-
erty holder to resist the military demands of the central government.15 4
But as the negligible role of these provisions in subsequent legal doctrine
suggests, 155 none of these mechanisms are the most effective candidates
for ensuring increased citizen participation or consent today.
For one thing, even in its heyday, the militia corresponded to a con-
ception of citizenship which we would now find intolerably narrow:
male,15 6 mostly white, 15 7 and property-based. 158  Moreover, the fre-
quently-made argument that re-vitalizing such mechanisms has little
value in an age of nuclear warheads and underground missile silos has
considerable force.'19 What is necessary, as I suggested earlier, is to pen-
etrate the specifics of these arrangements to reach an understanding of
their meaning; and then to see if that meaning can be given contempo-
rary life.
It would be foolish, and dangerous, to argue for a contemporary
154. These mechanisms were incorporated, respectively, in the arrangements of the militia
clauses and in the Second and Third Amendments. The decision to choose the full Congress, rather
than the executive branch or the Senate, as the locus of control over military power also demon-
strates this desire to disperse, rather than concentrate, consent over the use of military force,
although in a different fashion. The most dramatic proposal for incorporating a requirement of
intensified consent in regard to military force into the Constitution - the proposal to include an
amendment requiring a super-majority vote of Congress to raise troops - never made it into the
final Bill of Rights, as discussed above. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. But while some
might argue that the rejection of this proposal signified rejection of the entire idea of such consent,
my claim is that the multiplicity of ways in which the demand for widespread consent to military
force repeatedly surfaced demonstrates how crucial an area of eighteenth century concern this was.
155. See supra Section II, parts D-F.
156. Brown, supra note 142, at 665, 667; see also Ruth H. Bloch, The Gendered Meanings of
Virtue in Revolutionary America, 13 SIGNs 37 (1987).
157. See Cottroll & Diamond, supra note 104; see also Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,
416-17 (1856).
158. This was true of the Third Amendment as well - it gave rights only to propertied citizens.
For an interesting discussion of whether the protected class included only those with full fee simple
ownership interests, or covered a broader range of property "rights," see Engblom v. Carey, 677
F.2d 957, 961-64 (2d Cir. 1982).
159. But as Perpich v. Department of Defense, 110 S. Ct. 2418 (1990) and Ramirez de Arrel-
lano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983) suggest, these mechanisms are far from com-
pletely archaic. See discussion supra notes 90-93, 116-22 and accompanying text. See also Levinson,
supra note 124.
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diffusion of power based on widespread possession of armaments and lo-
cally-controlled militia forces drilling in our city streets."6 Decentral-
ized possession of the actual instrumentalities of military violence is
neither feasible nor desirable under contemporary conditions. However,
this makes it all the more important to find other, less physical, means to
assure decentralized control over these instrumentalities. The broad dif-
fusion of political conversation, what Paul Brest has called "discursive
participation,"16' is such a mechanism.
What I am suggesting is a shift from a mode of decentralization
which rests on countering power with power 62 to a mode which seeks to
foster broad participatory conversation. Such a shift would reflect cer-
tain important themes in feminist thinking. These ideas of feminist the-
ory contribute to our understanding of the importance of such
conversation and to our knowledge of how to foster it.
B. Feminism and the Importance of Voice
One of the core preoccupations of feminist thinking has been the
notion of voice. Since so many women, at least until recently, have
shared the experience of feeling unheard,'63 especially by those with
power, interest in recognizing and encouraging the development of each
person's. voice has always been a key feminist value.
The collaborative authors of Women's Ways of Knowing: The Devel-
opment of Self, Voice, and Mind set out to learn more about the processes
by which "ordinary women find their voice and use it to gain control
160. But for evidence that such a situation is far from unimaginable in the late twentieth cen-
tury, one need look only as far as recent newspaper headlines about Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union. See, e.g., Jeremy R. Azrael & Sergei Zamascikov, The Enemies Within, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1991, at D15; John Tagliabue, Envoy Accuses Army of Aiding Serbs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1991, at
A3. One of the Bush administration's primary concerns over the recent breakup of the monolithic
Soviet Union, has been the future control of the former Union's gigantic nuclear stockpile. Several
of the independent states such as the Ukraine and Islamic republics have attempted to claim control
over the arms and munitions physically present within their borders at the time the Union dissolved.
See, e.g., Michael Wines, Baker Will Visit Ukraine to Discuss Nuclear Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1991, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Moscow Seen as Controlling A-Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1991, at A10;
Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Concerned That as the Soviet Union Breaks Up, So Does the Soviet Military,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1991, at A19.
161. See Brest, supra note 137, at 194; Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revivak To-
ward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1624 (1988).
162. By "power with power" I mean the power of the armed central government with the dis-
persed but collective power of the armed citizenry, organized as the "well regulated militia."
163. See MARY F. BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
SELF, VOICE, AND MIND 5 (1986) ("In everyday and professional life, as well as in the classroom,
women often feel unheard even when they believe they have something important to say.").
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over their lives." 164 Based on in-depth interviews with over one hundred
women of different ages and classes, they developed a series of what they
call "epistemological positions" which they abstracted from the reflec-
tions of the women that they interviewed. While it is not claimed that
these positions represent any straight-line sequence of development, they
can be placed in an order that moves toward increasing complexity of
thought and sureness of articulation; that is, toward an increasingly de-
veloped voice. "Silence," the first position, is described as one in which
"women experience themselves as mindless and voiceless and subject to
the whims of external authority."1 65 The remaining categories are "re-
ceived knowledge,"1 66 "subjective knowledge,"' 167 "procedural knowl-
edge," 168 and "constructed knowledge." 169
The "constructed knowers," who have combined "objective knowl-
edge" with the passion and creativity of their own concerns, appear to be
the most successful at acting in the world in ways which are simultane-
ously satisfying and productive. It is they who have found their own
voice. While the main goal of the book is descriptive, in its final chapters
the authors begin to explore the conditions, primarily in the family and
in the schools, that best promote development of this orientation. A sub-
sequent project currently in progress by Mary Field Belenky, one of the
book's co-authors, and her collaborators focuses more directly on this
latter concern: how to discover the keys to the "empowerment process -
of moving the silenced into voice." 170
This question must be central to any serious effort to foster wide-
spread political participation of the kind envisioned by republican theory.
While general discussion of this complex but crucial topic is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is significant to note that the arena of military
policy is one in which the general population is particularly silenced. In-
164. Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 15.
166. "[A] perspective from which women conceive of themselves as capable of receiving, even
reproducing, knowledge from the all-knowing external authorities but not capable ofcreating knowl-
edge on their own." Id.
167. "[A] perspective from which truth and knowledge are conceived of as personal, private,
and subjectively known or intuited." Id.
168. "[W]omen are invested in learning and applying objective procedures for obtaining and
communicating knowledge." Id.
169. "[A] position in which women view all knowledge as contextual, experience themselves as
creators of knowledge, and value both subjective and objective strategies for knowing." Id.
170. Mary F. Belenky et al., From Silence to Voice: The Role of Connected Knowing in the
Development of Women, Family, and Community (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
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deed, if we consider the process of "nuclear numbing" described earlier,
or the sense of disempowerment most individuals feel in connection with
complex decisions about national security and defense policy, we can see
an intriguing parallel between the types of knowing described in Wo-
men's Ways of Knowing and people's feelings about the possibility of
playing a more participatory role. Many will feel limited to the stances
of "silence" ("voiceless and subject to the whims of external authority")
or, at best, "received knowledge" ("capable of receiving, even reproduc-
ing, knowledge from the all-knowing external authorities but not capable
of creating knowledge on their own"). Some, operating from the orienta-
tion of "subjective knowledge" ("truth and knowledge are conceived of
as personal, private, and subjectively known or intuited") may feel op-
posed to official policy, but believe they have no sufficient basis on which
to justify their position and no way to express their opposition except
through private complaining and cynical withdrawal. Only those who
are first able to develop "procedural knowledge" (learning "objective
procedures for obtaining and communicating knowledge") and then to
integrate this knowledge with their own values and concerns to shape a
personal form of "constructed knowledge" (experiencing themselves as
"creators of knowledge") will be able to envision playing a meaningful
role as citizens in the shaping of public policy about the military.
Carol Cohn, a feminist psychologist, has written about the particu-
lar difficulties involved in developing a voice with which citizens can en-
gage in critical thinking about that core of our military policy known as
"strategic doctrine" - the theory of nuclear weaponry. Driven by a
compelling desire to learn how those who develop this theory could
"think this way," Cohn spent a year at a special institute studying strate-
gic theory. In her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of De-
fense Intellectuals,"'' she describes her discovery that the very language
used by strategic theorists prevents both certain questions from being
raised and also excludes the uninitiated from participation.
In the world of "technostrategic language," which is a pseudo-scien-
tific jargon composed of abstractions, acronyms, and euphemisms, speak-
ers of ordinary English - no matter how well-informed - are treated as
"ignorant, simpleminded, or both." '1 72 At the same time, if one speaks in
the technostrategic language in order to demonstrate legitimacy and gain
171. Carol Cohn, Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, 12 SIGNS 687
(1987).
172. Id. at 708.
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respect, it becomes impossible to express certain ideas. Cohn uses the
example of the concept "peace," explaining that it
is not a part of this discourse. As close as one can come is "strategic stabil-
ity," a term that refers to a balance of numbers and types of weapon sys-
tems - not the political, social, economic, and psychological conditions
implied by the word "peace." Not only is there no word signifying peace in
this discourse, but the word "peace" itself cannot be used. To speak it is
immediately to brand oneself as a soft-headed activist instead of an
expert .... 173
When such ingrown and exclusionary forms of discourse come to domi-
nate policy making, this is fertile ground for a dangerous divorce between
the concerns of experts and the concerns of ordinary citizens.174
Originally, the feminist commitment to the importance of fostering
voice was a response to the traditional silencing of female voices, but it
has been extended to recognize the need to increase our capacity to hear
from others who have been excluded.175 In the arena of military policy,
women's voices historically have been almost entirely shut out, but this is
in a process of transition. '76 However, even if women and others now
excluded from the domains of technostrategic policy formation were ad-
mitted, so that those domains became more fully representative of the
population, this would not heal the split between expert and citizen.
The political scientist Jean Bethke Elshtain points out that while
173. Id.
174. Several writers have pointed out that the distinction between the technical language of
experts and the ordinary vocabulary of laypersons reflects a distinction between speakers who take
the standpoint of "users" or "deployers" of military weapons, and those who take the standpoint of
"victims." See id. at 706-07 & 706 n.39.
175. See, eg., Belenky et a., supra note 170, at 1-2, 4, 18 (describing their intention "to under-
stand how the silenced can be empowered to gain a voice and claim the powers of mind; how the
excluded can be supported to move from the margins to the center"). See also Mad J. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: CLS and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Martha
Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change" Law, Language, and Family Violence, 43 VAND.
L. REV. 1665, 1688 (1990); Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term - Foreword: Justice
Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV. 10, 86-88 (1987).
176. The active involvement of women in the Persian Gulf War has given renewed impetus to
the controversial claim that women should participate in the military on exactly the same terms as
men. Congress, and the country, have been reconsidering the role of women in the military, includ-
ing the traditional exclusion of women from combat. See Jon Nordheimer, Women's Role in Com-
bat: The War Resumes, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1991, at Al; Barbara Kantrowitz, The Right to Fight,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991, at 22. Regardless of what specific steps are taken in the immediate
future, it seems almost certain that women will play a significantly larger role in the nation's military
institutions, and therefore in the formation of its military policy, than they have in the past. For a
discussion of this process and its implications, see Stephanie Levin, Women and Violence: Reflections
on Ending the Combat Exclusion, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming spring 1992).
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more equal representation of women in the "nuclear priesthood"'177 of
strategic theorists means that "[w]omen, too, would speak in the voice of
the knowing insiders," the language would remain "dissociated: that is,
its linguistic use of euphemisms... removes it from what it claims to be
talking about." 171 Most important for present purposes, the language
would also remain exclusionary, "not available to most citizens, whether
male or female, for the ordinary tasks of everyday civic life."'7 9
Some opponents of this kind of technostrategic talk have sought to
counter it with a psychological or apocalyptic language for talking about
modem warfare and military strategy, an approach which centers on ac-
knowledging despair and doom."8 ' But while this approach may be valu-
able as a way of breaking through "nuclear numbing" or other forms of
apathy and disempowerment, Elshtain urges that there be a search for
another way which "promotes civic identity and connection."'' She
warns, however, that talk of enhanced citizen voice and participation
must go beyond the level of abstract platitude.18 2 It is here that a re-
newed decentralism - understood not as a panacea, nor as a substitute
for either private action or national politics, but as another locus for
meaningful citizen involvement - has its place.
Dean Paul Brest, in a friendly critique of neo-republican theo-
rists, 83 shares Elshtain's view that the commitment to enhanced citizen-
ship must go beyond the level of abstraction. He chides neo-republican
legal scholars for their obsession with the courts, their unfortunate will-
ingness to treat "the judiciary as the 'trace of the People's absent self-
government.' ,,184 Rejecting this court-centered approach, he urges in-
stead a search for "programs of genuine participatory democracy in the
177. This term is actually used as a self-description by strategic theorists; as Cohn notes in her
article, "[p]erhaps most astonishing of all is the fact that the creators of strategic doctrine actually
refer to members of their community as 'the nuclear priesthood.'" Cohn, supra note 171, at 702.
178. JEAN B. ELsHTAIN, WOMEN AND WAR 245 (1987).
179. Id.
180. A leading example of the psychological approach is JOANNA R. MACY, DESPAIR AND
PERSONAL POWER IN THE NUCLEAR AGE (1983), and of the apocalyptic approach is JONATHAN
SCHELL, THE FATE OF THE EARTH (1982).
181. ELSHTAIN, supra note 178, at 247.
182. Id. at 249. "A revitalized civic discourse must be neither abstract nor ahistorical but con-
crete and available to social participants." Id.
183. Brest, supra note 161.
184. Id. at 1625 (quoting Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term - Forewarc-
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4, 65 (1986)). See aso Kathryn Abrams, Law's
Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1591, 1603 (1988) (criticizing Michelman and Sunstein for their focus
on the judiciary rather than popular participation).
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multifold spheres of human activity."' 185 While his emphasis in that arti-
cle is on workplace democracy, the underlying thesis applies equally well
to local action. 18
6
Following Brest's advice, the final section of this Article will sketch
out an argument for "genuine participatory democracy" at the grassroots
level in the national security sphere. This argument has a foundation in
ideas of federalism, but it is a federalism which must be carefully distin-
guished both from the old "states' rights" version, and also from the
"new federalism" which is rooted in the federal government's attempt to
cast off responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry. 187 It is what I will
call a "participatory federalism" - a federalism that has the goal of cre-
ating more opportunities for citizen empowerment and meaningful par-
ticipation in national political life.
C. Grassroots Voices: Toward a Participatory Federalism
Historian Saul Cornell, writing about the constitutional contribu-
tions of the anti-federalists, recognizes that their heritage of decentraliza-
tion has been appropriated both by the left, to support an ideal of "active
participatory democracy," and by the right, to legitimize the "new feder-
alism." In order to understand the positive aspects of the anti-federalist
legacy, Cornell writes,
It is important to disentangle localism from its dark association with the
racist dimensions of states' rights theory. Moreover, it is vital to overcome
the post-New Deal association of central government with a progressive
social vision. For much of the nineteenth century it was individual locali-
ties and states, not the federal government, that were at the forefront of
progressive social change.188
185. Brest, supra note 161, at 1623.
186. Indeed, Brest points out that political scientists have looked to action at the local govern-
ment level as a critical education in citizenship. Id. at 1626. Kathryn Abrams also urges looking to
local institutions to "contribute to the development of a self-conscious, normatively-based, delibera-
tive popular politics .... using as an example Boston's Coalition for Community Control of Devel-
opment, to which she is an advisor. Abrams, supra note 184, at 1604-08. For an extended discussion
of the value of, and difficulties with, revitalizing local power, see Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HARV. L. RaV. 1057 (1980).
187. President Bush's most recent State of the Union address reflects this type of new federal-
ism. In outlining his "long-term plan to guarantee our future" the President made repeated refer-
ences to "get[ting] rid of 246 programs that don't deserve Federal funding. Some of them have noble
titles, but none of them is indispensible.... It's time to replace the assumptions of the welfare state
and help reform the welfare system." President George Bush, State of the Union Address (January
27, 1992), reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29. 1992, at Al.
188. Saul A. Cornell, The Changing Historical Fortunes of the Anti-Federalists, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 39, 71 (1989).
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Cornell is correct that in order to envision an attractive federalism,
as opposed to one linked with angry mobs keeping African-American
children out of school or a federal government abandoning its responsi-
bilities to the states, one must reject the automatic equation that "states'
rights" equals "bad" and "federal government" equals "good." On the
other hand, it would be just as mistaken simply to reverse the equation
and look to local government for guaranteed progressivism and the cen-
tral government for certain evil. At one time, as Cornell points out, pro-
gressive innovations originated at the state or local level and were
undermined by an unresponsive federal judiciary.18 9 It is equally true
that during other periods progressive change began at the federal level
and was resisted by the states. 190 The choice of which level of govern-
ment is the most favorable locus for action cannot be made abstractly
and ahistorically; the answer, as with so many things, is "it depends."
Exploring the question of whether minority groups would be likely
to receive better protection from government at the local, state or federal
level, Martha Minow reached a similar conclusion. She found that no
universal lesson could be drawn from the experiences of various groups
at various times and that the "importance of particular historical circum-
stances, political tides, and geographic distribution of minority groups"
outweighed any structural abstraction. 91
Does this mean, then, that federalism as a value is empty, and that
the only question is where, at any particular time on any particular issue,
one is most likely to find a congenial result? Not quite. As Minow con-
cludes, in relation to the interests of minority groups, "what may be most
important is simply the existence of multiple governmental authorities,
for it is the presence of multiple authorities that, paradoxically, gives mi-
nority groups and their members the opportunity to seek alternative an-
swers."' 192 She ties this idea to Robert Cover's work on "jurisdictional
redundancy," in which he argues that the overlapping federal and state
court systems serve citizen's interests by permitting alternative opportu-
189. For example, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wage and hour laws and
other forms of protective worker legislation were passed by the state legislatures and then invalidated
by the federal judiciary. See, eg., Morehead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (invali-
dating state minimum wage law); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state prohibi-
tion of "yellow dog" contracts); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating state
maximum hour law).
190. This was true during the civil rights movement of the 1950's and 1960's. See, eg., Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78
Stat. 241 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 a & ff (1988)).
191. Martha Minow, Pluralisms, 21 CoNN. L. REv. 965, 977 (1989).
192. Id. at 977-78.
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nities to be heard and receive a favorable outcome. 193
In this sense, what is important about federalism is not that it lo-
cates power "here" or "there" - not that some things are assigned irre-
trievably to the federal government or others to the states - but that it
creates a tension about power, so that there are competing sources of
authority rather than one unitary sovereign. Hannah Arendt has written
that "perhaps the greatest American innovation in politics as such was
the consistent abolition of sovereignty within the body politic of the re-
public, the insight that in the realm of human affairs sovereignty and
tyranny are the same."' 94 Akhil Amar has expressed what is actually the
same basic insight in a very different formulation, writing that the Amer-
ican innovation was to place sovereignty "in the People themselves."' 195
Whether one views unitary sovereignty as abolished or relocated to
the people, the key point is that it is no longer considered to be in any
unitary government. Governmental institutions are divided and kept in
tension. At the federal level, this is the familiar doctrine of separation of
powers. The same principle animates federalism. The tension is valued
because it creates space for the expression of suppressed viewpoints and
helps to prevent any one orthodoxy from achieving complete hegemony.
Amar sums up the contribution that this governmental innovation makes
to the liberty of the people by writing: "As with separation of powers,
federalism enabled the American People to conquer government power
by dividing it. Each government agency, state and national, would have
incentives to win the principal's affections by monitoring and challenging
the other's misdeeds." 196
This is a compelling insight, but the way Professor Amar has framed
it presents two difficulties for present purposes. First, by naming only
193. See Robert Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innova-
tion, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639 (1981). Public interest and civil rights lawyers have learned this
lesson again in the 1990's, as they turn from filing cases in federal court to more receptive state
courts instead.
194. ARENDT, supra note 138, at 152. See discussion in John Diggins, Class, Classical, and
Consensus Views of the Constitution, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 555, 561-64 (1988).
195. Akhil Amar, OfSovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1435 (1987). For a pro-
vocative and complex explication of the process of creating the fiction of popular sovereignty, see
EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENG-
LAND AND AMERICA (1988).
196. Amar, supra note 195, at 1450. In her opinion for the Court in the recent case of Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2400 (1991), Justice O'Connor describes these advantages of federalism
at length: "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate Branches of the Federal Gov-
ernment serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one Branch, a healthy balance
of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse
from either front."
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the "state" and "national" governments, it ignores the field of local gov-
ernment action, a field particularly accessible to the direct involvement of
the very citizens who constitute Amar's sovereign "People."' 19 7 Second,
by making the subject of the verb the "government agency," the sentence
makes it sound as if it were the "government agency" which acts, rather
than recognizing that it is people who act though the agencies of
government.
Since the focus here is on federalism as a means of fostering civic
participation, both of these qualifications are crucial. While state govern-
ment will sometimes be an excellent locus for citizen action, often local
government will provide the best forum for ordinary citizens to find their
voices in civic conversation. And because the value of federalism for our
purposes is in the enhanced opportunities it provides for citizen partici-
pation in policy development, the focus must be not on government insti-
tutions acting, but on people acting through them.
In summary, three key attributes of participatory federalism must be
highlighted. The first is that what is most important is not where govern-
ment power is assigned - to the federal government, the states, or the
localities - but the very fact that there are shared and overlapping pow-
ers. This dispersion of power means that the citizen is better protected
from the dangers that are inherent in being subject to any one unitary
sovereign. 198
A second key attribute is that the value of this federalism lies not in
the empowerment of government, but in the empowerment of people. Its
animating purpose is not to add to or detract from the powers of any
particular level of government, but to provide the most fruitful arrange-
ments for enhancing the possibility of genuine citizen control over
government.
Third, the only meaningful measure of the success or failure of this
type of federalism is the extent to which it contributes to increased op-
portunities for citizens to have a voice in government. This must be not
197. Carol Rose has made a parallel point, observing that one difficulty with the linkage be-
tween republicanism and a "states' rights" view of federalism is that the states themselves are too
large for the kind of direct civic participation that republicanism desires. She believes it would be
more fruitful to look to "local political organizations," which really are small enough to permit
expression of a "local civic voice." Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs; The Federalist Em-
pire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74,
94-96 (1989).
198. This is why champions of decentralization like the anti-federalists can be viewed as linked
to an older anti-monarchical tradition. See Morgan, supra note 195, at 280-87; see also Rose, supra
note 197, at 80-89.
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at the level of deceptive abstraction - "the People speak" - but at the
very concrete level of actual people with actual voices. The goal is for
more people to be able to speak up in settings more empowering than
their living rooms - and certainly state and local governments, while
not the only possible settings, provide such an opportunity.
In conclusion, these general principles of participatory federalism
must be linked to the specific case of federalism in connection with mili-
tary policy. The constitutional arrangements concerning military power
which were described in Section II fit with these three attributes of par-
ticipatory federalism quite well.
The first attribute calls for dispersing power by sharing it. As has
already been suggested, the military arrangements in the Constitution
were designed to achieve exactly this sort of liberating tension between
the national government's military powers and the decentralized state
and locally-controlled institutions by which these powers were to be car-
ried out.
The second attribute calls for empowering people rather than gov-
ernmental institutions. Here, too, the constitutional arrangements seem
to fit. The purpose of the grants of power in the relevant constitutional
clauses was not to endow any unit of government with the prerogatives
of military power for its own sake. The reason for creating these powers
was not to strengthen government but to protect the citizenry - to "pro-
vide for the common defense." Given this, it seems anomalous for the
federal government - or any branch of the American government - to
claim a right to control or use military violence as an inherent attribute
of sovereignty.1 99 The only justification for this power is in whether it
contributes to the security of the citizens.
Finally, the idea that federalism should serve the purpose of enhanc-
ing citizen voice can also be linked to decentralized arrangements for the
control of military power. In the eighteenth century, as I have suggested
earlier, the mechanism for expressing "voice" was physical: the militia-
member showed up at muster, rifle on shoulder, to participate bodily in a
"conversation" about military force.2" Today, it can be hoped that our
civic conversation can be more verbal. However, we should translate the
199. But see supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text (discussion of Curtiss-Wright).
200. The militia's mode of citizen participation centered around the display and practice of
physical force. Frequently it was organized in a hierarchical and authoritarian fashion. But since it
was a military institution, the militia could also serve as an important locus for actual conversation
and dialogue that led to the generation of revolutionary ideas. Compare Morgan, supra note 195, at
169-71 (describing service in the militia as a "school of subordination") with Eric Foner, Tom
Paine's Republic" Radical Ideology and Social Change, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORA-
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underlying meaning of the eighteenth century mechanism - a meaning
of citizen participation and consent - into a modality more appropriate
to contemporary life rather than relinquish it altogether.
I would argue that such a translation leads to three central conclu-
sions. The first is theoretical: we must challenge those mental preconcep-
tions which favor totally centralized power in the military policy arena.
We must stop seeing control over military power as belonging "natu-
rally" to the federal government and even more narrowly to the execu-
tive branch within it. Instead, we must reconceptualize our
understanding of the national arrangements to envision a dynamic and
uncertain balance among different sources of power, not only among the
three branches of the federal government, but between centralized and
decentralized institutions of government as well.2" While the role of the
federal government is, of course, crucial, the roles of the states and locali-
ties are more than interstitial and should not be allowed to atrophy.
Only in this dynamic tension does the best protection for the citizenry lie.
The second conclusion is doctrinal. Legal doctrine should not raise
barriers to local action in the field of military policy on the grounds that
such action is per se unconstitutional because it intrudes into an area
exclusively committed to the national government. This means that the
reasoning of cases like United States v. City of Oakland202 or Fossella v.
Dinkins,203 which describe military policy as the exclusive province of
the federal government, should be rejected and that of cases like Arthur
D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health & Hospitals of Cambridge,2'
which recognize that "not every regulation which has some incidental
effect on a defense program is invalid under the supremacy clause,"2 5
should be followed.20 6
TIONS IN THE HIsToRY OF AMERICAN RADICALISM 187, 196 (Alfred F. Young ed., 1976) (describ-
ing the militia as a "school of political democracy").
201. Cf Jeffrey M. Blum, Critical Legal Studies and the Rule of Law, 38 BuFF. L. REv. 59, 67
n.18 (1990) (suggesting we would be "safer and better off" if local government controlled our nu-
clear and covert action policies rather than federal bureaucracies).
202. No. C-89-3305 JPV (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1990), appealpending, No. 90-16538 (9th Cir.).
203. 494 N.Y.S.2d 878 (App. Div.), aff'd on state law grounds, 485 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1985).
204. 481 N.E.2d 441 (Ma. 1985).
205. 481 N.E.2d at 449.
206. Supreme Court precedent, although less than crystal clear, seems to favor this conclusion.
Three key cases are DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968);
and Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947). Clark rejected the claim that a California statute regulating
the inheritance rights of aliens was an unconstitutional invasion of the field of foreign affairs "exclu-
sively reserved... to the Federal Government," by calling the argument "farfetched." 331 U.S. at
516-17. But Zschernig, while expressly declining to overrule Clark, struck down a similar Oregon
statute, because, as applied, it intruded too deeply "into the field of foreign affairs which the Consti-
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This does not mean that there will never be a doctrinal basis for a
federal check on local action, but only that the legal test for that check
will fall within the doctrine of legislative pre-emption. As in the many
other areas of national policy in which the federal, state and local govern-
ments have overlapping responsibilities, federal law - expressed through
the will of Congress - will remain supreme. But where Congress has
not acted, it should not fall to the judiciary to invalidate local action at
the behest of the executive branch. The key, as in all pre-emption cases,
should be congressional intent.20 7 Nor should the demand for a clear
indication of congressional intention prior to finding pre-emption be any
less rigorous here than elsewhere.20 8
The final conclusion is pragmatic. It calls for re-invigorating local
action not just through theory and legal doctrine but through actual
grassroots practice. There is already, as Section I demonstrated, a sur-
prisingly lively universe of local activity in the military policy arena. To
the extent that our constitutional theory or our legal doctrine stand in
the way of this, they can be cleared away. But removing barriers is only
a first step. We also need to think seriously about committing resources,
both intellectual and financial, to the renewal of a much broader and
more diverse civic conversation about the true meaning of "national se-
curity." A full discussion of the steps this might involve is beyond the
scope of this paper,2 9 but action at the local level, for the reasons dis-
cussed in Section I, is one valuable locus for such conversations.
tution entrusts to the President and the Congress." 389 U.S. at 432. DeCanas, upholding a Califor-
nia law regulating the employment of aliens, reaffirms that there is no per se pre-emption of state or
local action by the constitutional foreign affairs power, "whether latent or exercised." 424 U.S. at
355. The key, as DeCanas suggests, and I would agree, is ordinary pre-emption analysis, based on
congressional enactments. Id. See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) and Board of Trust-
ees v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert. denied sub. nom. Lubman v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
207. See FMC Corp. v. Holiday, 11 S. Ct. 403,407 (1990); Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458
U.S. 654, 659 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
208. For arguments that the Court both has been, and should be, cautious in its reading of pre-
emptive intent see Ronald D. Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CoNST. CoM-
MENTARY 311, 312 (1988) and Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 72 (1988).
209. A number of groups and individuals have recently been working on ways to revitalize
grassroots debate and reconsideration of our military policy and of the true meaning of "national
security." The Committee on Common Security in Cambridge, MA and the SANE/Freeze Cam.
paign for Global Security, headquartered in Washington, D.C., are two organizations which have
been active in this process. Other important groups include the Center for Defense Information,
Washington, D.C.; Mobilization for Survival, N.Y., N.Y.; and the Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom, Philadelphia, PA. See PAM SOLO, FROM PROTmsr TO POLICY: BEYOND
THE FREEZE TO COMMON SECURITY (1988).
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CONCLUSION
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War era
require us to rethink the directions of our military policy.21 This his-
toric turning point provides an opportunity to reconsider the process by
which we arrive at our national security goals.
Some continue to believe that our safety lies in centralized power, in
technical solutions, in expert control. No doubt all of these to some de-
gree are necessary. But this view has monopolized the discussion for too
long. It is time to broaden the conversation.
As a realist, I have to agree with Paul Brest that "[p]articipatory
democracy has had few modern successes and many failures." '211 But I
also agree when he says, "the alternative is so bleak" that we must keep
trying. This Article urges loosening the tightly centralized structure of
control over military policy and creating space for and, indeed, welcom-
ing diverse local voices.
Will decentralized participation be untidy,, sometimes foolish, not
always to my liking?21 2 Yes. But I believe it is worth the risk. I do not
claim that local action will be a panacea for our problems. Mine is the
more modest hope that it might help.
210. See, eg., Patrick E. Tyler, Top Congressman Seeks Deeper Cuts in Military Budget, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1992, at Al.
211. Brest, supra note 161, at 1631.
212. Communities may lobby for nuclear weapons facilities as well as to declare themselves
nuclear free zones, or seek to attract military facilities as well as to oppose them. For a fascinating
study of the symbiotic relationship between a nuclear weapons production plant and the town
around it, see PAUL R. LOEB, NUCLEAR CULTURE (1986).

